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KEEPING SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM ALIVE:
A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO OUTLAWING
DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS IN DELAWARE
Danielle A. Rapaccioli*
Current trends in shareholder activism have brought to light the
competing interests of management and stockholders. With a rise in
shareholder activism, firms are continuing to include change in control
provisions, known as proxy puts, in their debt agreements to counter
activist success. Recent litigation regarding the use of these provisions has
created a debate as to whether these provisions are valid under Delaware
law. Moreover, companies and lending institutions have morphed these
provisions into a more restrictive form, known as “dead hand proxy puts.”
The controversy analyzed in this Note arises out of the use of dead hand
proxy puts in debt agreements.
The Delaware Chancery Court has considered the issue of proxy puts in
three recent cases. On no occasion has the court declared traditional or
dead hand proxy puts invalid; the court, however, expressed skepticism
toward these provisions. With a recognized entrenchment effect on
management and a deterrent effect on the stockholder franchise, the court
indicated that they could potentially be invalid in Delaware as a matter of
public policy.
This Note considers the rise of shareholder activism in the United States
and the use of both proxy puts and poison pills to defend against activist
investors and hostile takeovers. It analyzes the current debate over dead
hand proxy puts and compares these provisions to the already illegal dead
hand poison pills. It ultimately argues that dead hand proxy puts should be
outlawed in Delaware on the same basis as dead hand poison pills.
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INTRODUCTION
“Like an ‘imperial’ chairman you have taken steps to entrench yourself
that we believe to be unconscionable,” wrote Carl Icahn to Joseph Cook,
the Chairman of the Board of Amylin Pharmaceuticals.1 Icahn, one of the
largest shareholders of Amylin, scoffed at Cook’s dictatorial management
style.2 In doing so, he addressed Amylin’s defense mechanisms, which
were standing in the way of a proxy fight—a poison pill and two proxy puts
found in the company’s debt agreements.3 Icahn, hoping to enhance
stockholder value, held Amylin up as a prime example of what is wrong
with governance in most of corporate America and announced his intention
to fix it.4
Amylin had lost $5 billion in market value under current management,
and its share price had fallen 75 percent since its peak in 2007.5 Icahn and
Eastbourne Capital Management, a prominent activist investing firm,
wanted control of a majority of the board.6 There was one problem—the
company’s proxy puts prevented Icahn and Eastbourne from changing a
majority of the board of directors.7 Specifically, the proxy puts provided
that if a majority of Amylin’s board became comprised of “non-continuing
directors,” the company’s debt would be accelerated and Amylin would be
required to pay back $915 million immediately.8 Thus, if they were
successful in gaining a majority of the board, they would trigger the proxy
puts in the company’s debt agreements.9
The Delaware Chancery Court recently has scrutinized dead hand proxy
puts because of their effects on shareholders.10 With a traditional proxy
put, such as the one in San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin
Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,11 the current board of directors has the ability to
approve a newly elected board.12 Specifically, the traditional put allows the
current board to give new directors status as continuing directors,

1. Letter from Carl Icahn to Joseph C. Cook, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Amylin
Pharmaceutical, Inc. (Apr. 15, 2009), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/letterfrom-carl-icahn-to-amylin-pharmaceutical-inc-61824557.html
[https://perma.cc/A4U8E5ZA].
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See In Victory for Icahn, Amylin Chairman Is Ousted, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (June
2, 2009, 2:24 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2009/06/02/in-victory-for-icahn-amylinchairman-is-ousted/?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/3LSK-4LWQ].
6. Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K
(Apr. 20, 2009, 10:31 AM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com//2009/04/20/icahn-amylin-and-thenew-nuances-of-activist-investing/ [https://perma.cc/4QZP-QWAZ].
7. Id.
8. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304,
310 n.7 (Del. Ch. 2009).
9. See Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing, supra note 6.
10. See Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315.
11. 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009).
12. See id.; infra Part II.A.
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preventing the proxy put from being triggered.13 A mutation of this proxy
put includes a dead hand feature, which effectively prohibits any new
directors from being named as continuing directors, regardless of board
approval.14 In recent Delaware litigation, including the case brought
against Amylin, the Delaware Chancery Court has expressed skepticism
over the validity of these dead hand provisions.15
Although change in control provisions have existed for decades, the
proxy put has gained notoriety as a result of a wave of shareholder
activism.16 Carl Icahn and other similar investors believe that these
provisions both unlawfully entrench management and prevent them from
properly changing a company’s strategy to enhance shareholder value.17
Even if they believe, as in the case with Amylin, that the board of directors
is harming the company more than helping it, activist investors are less
likely to change the board of directors in light of the destabilizing financial
effects the proxy contest will have on the company.18
The Delaware Chancery Court has not outlawed dead hand proxy puts,
but has noted that their entrenching effects on management, and value
reducing effects on the stockholder franchise, could render them
unenforceable as a matter of law.19 In the most recent relevant case,20 the
Chancery Court broadly compared their effects to the effects of dead hand
poison pills, which were outlawed in 1998.21 This Note seeks to analyze
the legality of dead hand proxy puts. Specifically, it provides a
comparative analysis between dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy
puts. In doing so, this Note argues that the Delaware Chancery Court
should outlaw dead hand proxy puts on the same grounds that it outlawed
dead hand poison pills. The dead hand feature in both defense mechanisms
has a similar purpose and similar effects on shareholders and management.
As a result, the Delaware Chancery Court ultimately should conclude that
13. T. Brad Davey & Christopher N. Kelly, Dead Hand Proxy ‘Puts’ Face Continued
Scrutiny from Plaintiffs Bar, BLOOMBERG LAW (June 12, 2015), http://www.bna.com/deadhand-proxy-n17179927613/ [https://perma.cc/24D6-FQQZ].
14. Maxwell Murphy, ‘Proxy Puts’ Invite Shareholders, Attorneys to Come Knocking,
WALL STREET J. (June 1, 2015, 5:51 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/cfo/2015/06/01/proxy-putsinvite-shareholders-attorneys-to-come-knocking/ [https://perma.cc/YKD5-BRFQ]; see infra
Part I.B.3.
15. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315 (stating that the proxy puts might be unenforceable as
against public policy); see Transcript of Oral Argument at 80, Pontiac Gen. Emps. Ret. Sys.
v. Ballantine, No. 9789-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014) (asserting that proxy puts have a
recognized entrenchment effect and that lenders were on notice as to the potential
unenforceability of proxy puts).
16. See infra Part I.B.
17. Letter from Carl Icahn to Joseph C. Cook, Jr., supra note 1.
18. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 72 (discussing the effect that a
dead hand proxy put would have on shareholders’ willingness to wage a proxy contest); see
also DAVID WHISSEL, PERILOUS PROXY PUTS: EMBEDDED ANTI-TAKEOVER DEFENSES AND
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS 4 (2014) (explaining that a proxy put could potentially trigger a
liquidity crisis, which would have dramatic financial consequences for shareholders).
19. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315.
20. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 73.
21. See infra Part I.C.2 (discussing the illegalization of dead hand poison pills in
Delaware).
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dead hand proxy puts are unenforceable under the Delaware General
Corporation Law (DGCL).
Part I of this Note addresses the rise of shareholder activism and the
defense mechanisms used to counter activist success. Part II discusses
recent Delaware litigation regarding proxy puts and provides a discussion
of the competing interests and effects of dead hand proxy puts. Finally,
Part III provides a comparative analysis of the dead hand proxy put and
dead hand poison pill and, based on this analysis, concludes that the dead
hand proxy put should be outlawed.
I. SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS: SHAKING UP CORPORATE
BOARDROOMS ONE PROXY CONTEST AT A TIME
This part addresses the history of shareholder activism, as well as the
increasing influence that activist hedge funds have on corporations. Part
I.A discusses the rise of hedge fund activism in the United States. Part I.B
and Part I.C analyze proxy puts, including dead hand proxy puts, as well as
traditional and dead hand poison pills.
A. Shareholder Activism
One of the “hottest topic[s]” in corporate boardrooms today is
shareholder activism.22 Shareholder activism is loosely defined as those
actions taken by shareholders with the purpose of bringing about change
within a public company, but without taking over the company.23
Shareholder activism encompasses a number of activities that vary based on
the investors’ desired results, as well as the timing of the intervention and
the investors’ level of aggression in pursuing change.24 Some activist
investors focus on changing corporate governance practices, executive
compensation plans, or social policies.25 These investors are often less
aggressive than activist hedge funds, whose goal is to seek significant
change to a company’s corporate strategy, financial structure, management,
or board of directors.26
Activist hedge funds thus take a more assertive approach and often
“[T]he most obvious
engage in offensive shareholder activism.27
circumstance in which offensive shareholder activism will make sense is
where a potential activist ascertains that a company is ‘underperforming’
22. Sue Decker, Keeping Activist Investors at Bay: How Corporate Boards Can Help,
FORTUNE (Feb. 3, 2015, 11:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/02/03/keeping-activistinvestors-at-bay-how-corporate-boards-can-help [https://perma.cc/4NLD-2Y2C].
23. Paula J. Dalley, Shareholder (and Director) Fiduciary Duties and Shareholder
Activism, 8 HOUS. BUS. & TAX J. 301, 321–22 (2008); Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman,
Shareholder Activism As a Corrective Mechanism in Corporate Governance, 2014 B.Y.U. L.
REV. 1015, 1017.
24. PWC, SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM: WHO, WHAT, WHEN, AND HOW? 2 (2015).
25. See id. at 4; Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1018.
26. Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1018. This Note focuses on hedge fund
activism, as it is the form of activism that proxy puts serve to deter.
27. Brian R. Cheffins & John Armour, The Past, Present, and Future of Shareholder
Activism by Hedge Funds, 37 J. CORP. L. 51, 56–57 (2011).
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and that it will be feasible to prompt changes in financial policy or strategic
direction likely to increase shareholder returns.”28 Offensive shareholder
activists accumulate a significant portion of the company’s stock for the
purpose of forcing change.29 They traditionally target companies that are
underperforming relative to their peers and thus are failing to maximize
shareholder wealth.30 Once they have a stake in the company, activist
investors may pursue public media campaigns, sponsor shareholder
proposals, or initiate proxy contests to bring about change in the
company.31
Part I.A.1 and Part I.A.2 discuss, respectively, hedge fund activism in the
United States and the debate over the utility that activists provide to
corporations. Then, Part I.A.3 addresses activists’ use of proxy contests as
a strategy for gaining control over corporations.
1. The Rise of Hedge Fund Activism in the United States
Shareholder activism is not a new phenomenon in the United States.32 In
the early 1940s, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted a
regulation stating that “management must allow shareholder proposals that
constitute a ‘proper subject for action by securities holders.’”33 Shortly
thereafter, shareholders began proposing changes to corporate structure and
control.34 One early example of shareholder activism is attributed to
Benjamin Graham, a well-known value investor.35 In 1947, through the
operation of his trust company, Graham-Newman Corp., Graham
participated in an unsuccessful campaign to obtain seats on the board of
Bell Aircraft.36 As a result of this campaign and those that followed,

28. John H. Armour & Brian R. Cheffins, Origins of “Offensive” Shareholder Activism
in the United States, in ORIGINS OF SHAREHOLDER ADVOCACY 260 (Jonathan GS Koppell ed.,
2011).
29. Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1034.
30. See PWC, supra note 24, at 6–7.
31. See id. at 3–4; see also Stuart L. Gillan & Laura T. Starks, The Evolution of
Shareholder Activism in the United States, in INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR ACTIVISM: HEDGE
FUNDS & PRIVATE EQUITY, ECONOMICS & REGULATION 40–41 (William W. Bratton & Joseph
A. McCahery eds., 2015); infra Part I.A.3 (discussing the use of proxy contests).
32. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 31, at 39; see also Armour & Cheffins, supra note
28, at 254 (discussing traces of shareholder activism dating back to the first half of the
twentieth century).
33. Gillan & Starks, supra note 31, at 41. This regulation is similar to the current Rule
14a-8, which governs the requirements for including shareholder proposals in a company’s
proxy materials. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-8 (1998).
34. See Gillan & Starks, supra note 31, at 41.
35. Armour & Cheffins, supra note 28, at 257. Value investors purchase stocks of
companies that they believe the market has undervalued. They make a profit when they
purchase a stock at a deflated price and the price subsequently increases due to good news
reaching the market. Value Investing, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/v/
valueinvesting.asp (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/7CGL-PMTK].
36. Armour & Cheffins, supra note 28, at 257. In 1948, Graham also solicited proxies
from New Amsterdam Casualty Co. shareholders to improve the company’s dividend
payout. Id.
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certain investors in the 1950s and 1960s gained notoriety as “proxyteers”
for launching proxy contests for board control in U.S. public companies.37
While there are thus traces of shareholder activism throughout the early
twentieth century, hedge fund activism truly became prominent in the
1980s.38 In the 1980s, an era commonly considered the “Deal Decade,”
corporate raiders began buying up sizable portions of public companies.39
At this time, activists mostly operated through publically traded companies,
rather than privately controlled hedge funds, due to various restrictions
imposed by the Investment Company Act of 1940.40 A small number of
activists, nevertheless, chose to operate through private investment
companies.41 These practitioners are arguably the direct antecedents to the
high profile activist hedge funds that gained considerable notoriety in the
2000s.42 For example, Warren Lichtenstein established a private fund,
Steel Partners, in 1990 to buy a 9 percent interest in a steel company that he
believed was undervalued.43 He later formed Steel Partners II, which itself
became a prominent hedge fund in the 2000s, “with a mandate to invest in
undervalued firms and, if necessary, to seek to fix companies to increase
shareholder return.”44 Other individuals and institutional investors45 began
to create similar strategies, whereby they would buy up a sizable amount of
an undervalued company and lobby for change.46
Hedge fund activism continued to increase throughout the 1990s, in part
because of regulatory changes that made it easier for activists to
37. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 75.
38. See id. at 75–76.
39. See id.
40. Id. at 76–77. The purpose of the Investment Company Act of 1940 was to protect
the public and the interest of investors from the risks associated with investment companies.
Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1 (2012).
41. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 77. An investment company generally is
defined as “a company (corporation, business trust, partnership, or limited liability company)
that issues securities and is primarily engaged in the business of investing in securities.”
Investment Companies, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/answers/mfinvco.htm (last visited Apr. 29,
2016) [https://perma.cc/K5SX-X3QY].
42. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 77.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. An institutional investor is defined as “[s]omeone who trades large volumes of
securities, [usually] by investing other people’s money into large managed funds.” Investor,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
46. Carl Icahn, founder of Icahn Capital Management and Icahn Partners, is another
well-known activist investor who began as a corporate raider in the 1970s. His investment
philosophy entails buying up a sizeable portion of a company and promoting change, such as
overthrowing management, reducing waste, or selling off divisions. His goal is to increase
shareholder value by driving up share prices and subsequently selling his stake in the
company. Some of his notable targets include Yahoo! and Time Warner. See Steven
Bertoni, The Raider’s Radar, FORBES (Mar. 9, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
forbes/2011/0328/billionaires-11-profile-carl-icahn-biotech-twa-raiders-radar.html [https://
perma.cc/H22X-A4LN]; see also Reem Nasr, Carl Icahn Takes Stake in AIG, Demands
Company Break Itself Up, CNBC (Oct. 28, 2015, 9:36 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/10/
28/carl-icahn-takes-stake-in-aig-demands-company-break-itself-up.html (discussing one of
Icahn’s recent well-known targets, American International Group) [https://perma.cc/8GRU2PXC].
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disseminate information to shareholders.47 In 1992, the SEC amended its
proxy regulations so that large shareholders had the ability to exercise their
voting rights more effectively.48 This amendment allowed for increased
communication among shareholders, with fewer disclosure requirements.49
It “made clear that most shareholders were free to make public statements,
including speeches, press releases, newspaper advertisements, broadcast
media, and internet communications.”50 Individual investors, as well as
institutional investors, could then easily combine their ownership interests
and exert more influence over a company.51
Activists began playing an increasingly large role in corporate
boardrooms in the early 2000s.52 The increase in activism at this time was
partially in response to the discovery of high-profile corporate fraud at large
U.S. corporations, such as Enron, Tyco, and Worldcom.53 These scandals
undermined confidence in both the quality of management and the idea that
management was not adequately promoting shareholder value.54 While the
SEC and Congress mainly were concerned with corporations cleaning up
their accounting, legal, and corporate governance issues, hedge funds
reminded management not to ignore business strategy and shareholder
returns.55
2. Recent Trends in Hedge Fund Activism
Shareholder activism has gained “considerable speed” over the past five
years, with the number of activist interventions increasing by 88 percent
from 2010 to 2013.56 Activist interventions have increased partly because
hedge funds are able to raise more capital and thus dramatically increase

47. Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 84.
48. Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 STAN.
L. REV. 1255, 1278–79 (2008).
49. See id.; Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 90.
50. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 48, at 1277; see also Rose & Sharfman, supra
note 23, at 1019 (stating that the SEC has shown support for shareholders through rules and
policies, including those related to communication between shareholders in the context of
proxy voting).
51. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note 48, at 1277.
52. See Allan Murray, Hedge Funds Are New Sheriffs of Boardroom, WALL STREET J.
(Dec. 14, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB113451884230621753?alg=y
[http://perma.cc/58UM-MWK6].
53. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 84; see also David Benoit, Activism’s
Long Road from Corporate Raiding to Banner Year, WALL STREET J. (Dec. 26, 2015, 12:01
AM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activisms-long-road-from-corporate-raiding-to-banneryear-1451070910 (discussing shareholders’ reactions toward management after the downfall
of Enron and WorldCom) [https://perma.cc/4MHB-TMRB].
54. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 27, at 84.
55. See Murray, supra note 52.
56. Peter Galuszka, The Activist Era, NAT. ASSOC. CORP. DIRECTORS DIRECTORSHIP,
Mar. 29, 2014, at 34. In 2014 alone, 344 companies worldwide were subject to activist
demands. See THE VALENCE GRP., ACTIVIST INVESTING: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF TRENDS IN
SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 8 (Josh Black ed., 2015). The number of demands increased by 18
percent from 2013. Id.
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their assets under management.57 As activist funds continue to grow, they
target larger, iconic corporations that were “previously thought invulnerable
due to their size.”58 For example, hedge fund activists like Carl Icahn,
Nelson Peltz, and Bill Ackman are buying ownership in some of America’s
largest companies, including Proctor & Gamble, Yahoo!, and Apple, and
then lobbying for strategic change.59
Moreover, activist campaigns have been increasingly successful.60 In
2014 alone, activist demands were met 74 percent of the time.61 More
specifically, when the activists’ goal was to acquire board seats, the
demands were met 73 percent of the time, allowing activists to gain board
seats at 107 companies.62 Contributing to this success is not only the
increase in hedge fund capital, but also an increase in support from
institutional investors such as mutual funds and pension funds.63 Since
large mutual funds are often the biggest stockholders of a corporation,
gaining their support puts “activist[s] on the path to victory, while losing it
can spell doom.”64 With support from institutional investors, activists can
purchase a smaller stake in a company, spend less money, and still win.65
Opponents of hedge fund activism argue that activists’ growth and
increased success rate are hurting both corporate boardrooms and
shareholders.66 They contend that activists consider only short-term effects
on share price, forcing management to ignore the long-term growth of the
57. FTI CONSULTING, THE SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISTS’ VIEW 2 (2015), http://
www.fticonsulting.com/~/media/Files/us-files/insights/reports/shareholder-activism-parti.pdf
[https://perma.cc/4XBN-GXNF]. Through the second quarter of 2015, hedge fund activists
held over $120 billion in assets. See Giles Turner, The Activist Floodgates Are Open, WALL
STREET J. (Aug. 7, 2015, 7:18 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/moneybeat/2015/08/07/the-activistfloodgates-are-open-j-p-morgan-says/ [https://perma.cc/SX4H-FV9P].
58. THE VALENCE GRP., supra note 56, at 6.
59. David Benoit & Vipal Monga, Are Activist Investors Helping or Undermining
American Companies?, WALL STREET J. (Oct. 5, 2015, 1:55 PM), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/activist-investors-helping-or-hindering-1444067712/
[https://perma.cc/WC3FZY9J]; see also THE VALENCE GRP., supra note 56, at 6 (discussing an increase in activist
investors’ campaigns against large U.S. companies).
60. THE VALENCE GRP., supra note 56, at 6.
61. See id. at 9.
62. David Benoit & Kirsten Grind, Activist Investors’ Secret Ally: Big Mutual Funds,
WALL STREET J. (Aug. 9, 2015, 10:38 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/activist-investorssecret-ally-big-mutual-funds-1439173910 [https://perma.cc/VY8R-W2C4]. For 2015, the
number of activist campaigns increased to 360, and the board seats won in those campaigns
increased to 127. See Benoit, supra note 53.
63. See Rose & Sharfman, supra note 23, at 1019; Benoit & Grind, supra note 62.
64. Benoit & Grind, supra note 62. Note that the plaintiffs in the cases discussed in Part
II.A and II.C are pension funds.
65. Id. Traditionally, a 5 percent ownership stake was the threshold for shareholder
activists to be able to influence the target company. MARC ZENNER ET AL., THE ACTIVIST
REVOLUTION: UNDERSTANDING & NAVIGATING A NEW WORLD OF HEIGHTENED INVESTOR
SCRUTINY 6 (2015). More recently, activists have been successful while owning only less
than 1 percent of a target company. Id.
66. John Carney, Welcome to the Golden Age of Activist Investors, CNBC (Aug. 14,
2013), http://www.cnbc.com/id/100963166 [https://perma.cc/2UK6-PU9T]; Steve Denning,
The Seven Deadly Sins of Activist Hedge Funds, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2015/02/15/the-seven-deadly-sins-of-activisthedge-funds/#b2efb2544477 [https://perma.cc/4BPM-QZZT].
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company.67 “Data show a broad array of companies have been plowing
more cash into dividends and stock buybacks, while spending less on
investments such as new factories and research and development.”68 These
commentators further argue that activism “create[s] a massive distraction
for managers from the real task of management.”69
Activists, on the other hand, are gaining popularity and, according to
SEC Chairwoman Mary Jo White, losing their “distinctly negative
connotation.”70 Supporters of activist investing contend that shareholder
activism represents a necessary check on corporate boardrooms and does
not promote short-term gains at the expense of long-term performance.71
Carl Icahn explained that he has, as an activist investor, held many stocks
for the long term—in some instances for over thirty years.72 He further
defended activism by explaining that sometimes the wrong people are
running corporations.73 He has argued that his job is to clean up corporate
America by removing bad managers and holding CEOs accountable.74
Additionally, a recent study revealed that, in most cases, research and
development, profits, and capital investment all improved in response to
intervention.75
3. The Use of Proxy Contests
Activist investors’ approaches to influencing a corporation “range from
the relatively benign to extremely hostile.”76 One example of the latter is
67. Carney, supra note 66; Stephen Foley, Shareholder Activism: Battle for the
Boardroom, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/a555abec-be32-11e3961f-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3uykqgFpD [https://perma.cc/V7RA-9AAF].
68. Vipal Monga, David Benoit & Theo Francis, As Activism Rises, U.S. Firms Spend
More on Buybacks than Factories, WALL STREET J. (May 26, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/
articles/companies-send-more-cash-back-to-shareholders-1432693805
[https://perma.cc/
C2BV-88XB].
69. Denning, supra note 66.
70. Corporate Upgraders, ECONOMIST (Feb. 13, 2014), http://www.economist.com/
news/leaders/21596518-america-should-make-life-easier-not-harder-activist-investorscorporate-upgraders [https://perma.cc/C68F-MFVS].
71. Benoit & Monga, supra note 59; see also James Saft, In Praise of Activist
Investment, REUTERS (Aug. 14, 2013, 4:34 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-columnactivistinvestors-saft-idUSBRE97D17I20130814 (discussing that activists not only create
short term gains, but also improve the long term performance of companies they target)
[http://perma.cc/CL77-NGJ7].
72. The New York Times Conferences, DealBook Conference 2015—Activist Investing,
YOUTUBE (Nov. 3, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=GsN0WVLjpcs [https://
perma.cc/Q7RM-C7A8].
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See An Investor Calls, ECONOMIST (Feb. 7, 2015), http://www.economist.com/news/
briefing/21642175-sometimes-ill-mannered-speculative-and-wrong-activists-are-rampantthey-will-change-american [https://perma.cc/544J-A5V5]. A Harvard Law School study
focused on the performance of firms targeted by activists in the five-year period after activist
intervention. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Alon Brav & Wei Jiang, The Long-Term Effects of
Hedge Fund Activism, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1085, 1101 (2015). The study found no
evidence that activist interventions create short-term gains at the expense of long-term
performance. See id. at 1117.
76. See MARC ZENNER ET AL., supra note 65, at 7.
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the use of proxy contests as a means of gaining control of the corporate
board.77 In a proxy contest, an activist shareholder will nominate its own
slate of directors to the company’s board.78 Nominating a new board will
allow them to make changes they deem necessary to enhance the value of
the company.79 Proxy contests also are used in the context of hostile
takeovers, as corporate raiders often need to elect a new board of directors
whose interest in a merger or acquisition aligns with their own.80
Incumbent management often do not want to give up power, however; they
“tend to have self-interested motives for maintaining control: they want to
retain the private benefits (such as high salaries and perks) that are
associated with exercising control.”81 Thus, shareholders, through the use
of proxy contests, can facilitate beneficial control changes, even if the
incumbent management opposes the change.82
Proxy contests are governed by a combination of federal regulation, state
law, and corporate charter and bylaw provisions.83 These rules regulate the
disclosure of fraud in proxy solicitation, revocability of proxies, access by
shareholders to corporate information, and time and place of shareholder
meetings.84 Activists have been increasingly successful in winning proxy
contests.85 As a result of these successes, corporate boards—with the help
of lending institutions—increasingly are adopting defense provisions which
inhibit shareholders’ use of proxy contests to compel changes in a
company’s corporate structure or board of directors.86
B. The Proxy Put Defense Mechanism
Corporate boards use various defense mechanisms both to ward off
shareholder activists and to reduce the chances of an activist bringing about
a successful proxy contest. This section explains the evolution of the proxy
put, an embedded defense mechanism87 that has conflicting implications.
On the one hand, proxy puts serve as a device to protect creditors and
77. Armour & Cheffins, supra note 28, at 257.
78. See Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Boardroom Strikes Back, N.Y. TIMES:
DEALB%K (Apr. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/22/business/dealbook/theboardroom-strikes-back.html (describing examples of activist investors using proxy contests
for board seats as a means of influencing strategic change at a company) [http://perma.cc/
42XX-R6NP].
79. Id. Activists often seek change in the form of issuing a larger dividend, launching a
share buyback program, or spinning off a business line. See Anabtawi & Stout, supra note
48, at 1279.
80. See Julian Velasco, The Enduring Illegitimacy of the Poison Pill, 27 J. CORP. L. 381,
383–84 (2002).
81. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy
Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REV. 1071, 1077 (1990).
82. See id. at 1077–78.
83. See id. at 1082.
84. See id.
85. See BRENDAN SHEEHAN, TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER ACTIVISM 579 (2014), http://
ggainc.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Shareholder_activism_October_20141.pdf [https://
perma.cc/9MKK-SS87]
86. See infra Part I.B–C.
87. See infra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
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corporations from activist investors. On the other hand, they also serve as a
device to entrench management, impede shareholder rights, and limit a
board’s ability to manage the business and affairs of the corporation. Part
I.B.1 addresses poison puts, the antecedent to proxy puts. Part I.B.2
discusses proxy puts, a specific type of poison put. Finally, Part I.B.3
discusses dead hand proxy puts, which add more restrictive language to the
traditional proxy puts.
1. Poison Puts
Poison puts—also known as event-risk covenants or change in control
covenants—are contractual provisions commonly found in debt
instruments.88 They provide that, on the occurrence of a triggering event,89
some consequential remedy will become available to the debtholders.90 In
many cases, poison puts are triggered by a change in control.91 Upon such
change, the debtholder has the right, but not the obligation, to require a
corporation to pay back the outstanding loan.92 Poison put provisions have
been coined “unregulable takeover defenses” because they are not governed
by shareholder vote.93 Instead, they are subject to the full discretion of the
contracting parties.94
Poison puts frequently are found in documents governing large bond
issuances, however, they are not limited in this respect.95 Because these
provisions are written into contracts, they are considered “embedded
defenses.”96 An embedded defense is an action taken by managers for
supposed legitimate, nondefensive business reasons, but that also deters
tender offers, hostile acquisitions, and activist interventions.97 Managers
often employ embedded defenses, such as change in control provisions in

88. See FREDERICK L. BERESKIN & HELEN BOWERS, POISON PUTS: CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE OR MECHANISM FOR SHIFTING RISK? 1 (2015), http://irrcinstitute.org/wpcontent/uploads/2015/09/FINAL-Poison-Puts-Research-Sept-2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
T2T6-4NGA].
89. A triggering event could be a change in control of the board of directors, a
downgrade in bond rating, or the acquisition of a certain percentage of a corporation’s
shares. See Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in Bonds:
Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?, 40 UCLA L. REV. 931, 936–37
(1993).
90. See id.
91. See BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 1.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 2 (quoting Jennifer Arlen & Eric Talley, Unregulable Defenses and the Perils
of Shareholder Choice, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 577, 597 (2003)).
94. Id.
95. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 1. Poison puts may also be found in licensing
agreements, employment contracts, credit revolvers, and lease agreements. Id.
96. Arlen & Talley, supra note 93, at 597; see also Guhan Subramanian, The Emerging
Problem of Embedded Defenses: Lessons From Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l. v. UAL Corp.,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1242–43 (2007) (discussing embedded defenses as an antitakeover
defense mechanism).
97. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 3–4; Arlen & Talley, supra note 93, at 597.
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debt agreements, to insulate their own positions on the board rather than
serve legitimate business purposes.98
Debtholders created poison puts during the 1980s to hedge against the
risk associated with restructurings, takeovers, and leveraged buyouts.99
Bondholders also were interested in using these provisions to limit the risk
associated with a decline in bond ratings, or deterioration in a company’s
financial performance.100 If a rating agency downgraded a corporation’s
bonds after a takeover, bonds that were previously investment grade could
turn into “speculative grade junk,” forcing bondholders to realize an
enormous loss.101
The RJR Nabisco leveraged buyout is considered the pivotal transaction
in regard to promoting the use of poison puts in debt agreements.102
Kohlberg Kravis Roberts & Co. (KKR), a large private equity firm,
announced that it was considering a leveraged buyout of RJR Nabisco.103
As a result, the price of RJR Nabisco’s bonds dropped by 20 percent,
leaving bondholders facing losses of $1 billion.104 The acquisition also put
RJR into greater debt and thus increased the chances of default.105
In the aftermath of the RJR Nabisco buyout, corporate bond investors
began to demand increased protection.106 They became both more aware
of, and concerned with, event risk—the risk that bond prices will decline as
a result of a change in the capital structure of a firm.107 In an effort to
minimize this risk, banks began to negotiate poison puts into their
agreements to prevent investment schemes that would change the capital
structure of the firm.108 Independent of the benefit to bondholders, these
provisions were effective in insulating managers against both control
change and proxy contests.109

98. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4 (discussing the use of embedded defenses as a
management entrenchment device).
99. Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Defense Against Hostile Takeovers Develops a
Downside, N.Y. TIMES: DEALB%K (Nov. 25, 2014, 1:55 PM), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/
2014/11/25/a-defense-against-hostile-takeovers-develops-a-downside/
[https://perma.cc/U8JM-SEV4]; see also Leland Crabbe, Event Risk: An Analysis of Losses
to Bondholders and “Super Poison Put” Bond Covenants, 46 J. FIN. 689, 689 (1991).
100. See Crabbe, supra note 99, at 696–97.
101. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 933. Between 1984 and 1988, rating agencies
downgraded $30.79 billion in investment grade bonds to speculative grade. These bonds
were associated with capital restructurings. See Crabbe, supra note 99, at 689 n.1.
102. See Solomon, supra note 99; see also John C. Coffee Jr., Unstable Coalitions:
Corporate Governance As a Multi-Player Game, 78 GEO. L.J. 1495, 1519–21 (1990)
(discussing the RJR Nabisco buyout).
103. See Solomon, supra note 99.
104. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 932.
105. See Solomon, supra note 99.
106. See Crabbe, supra note 99, at 696–97.
107. See id.
108. See id.
109. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 946.
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2. Proxy Puts
A proxy put is a specific type of poison put designed to mitigate
management’s risk against actual or threatened proxy contests.110 While
poison puts are triggered by a number of different events, proxy puts are
specifically triggered by shareholders’ use of a proxy contest to replace a
majority of the board of directors.111 Proxy puts also are considered
“Hostile Control Change Covenants,” defined as covenants that protect
against a proxy challenge replacing a majority of a firm’s directors.112
“The triggering events included in Hostile Control Change Covenants
reflect an intent to protect management, however, not bondholders.”113
Commentators argue that these provisions, like traditional poison puts, can
serve to entrench incumbent board members to the detriment of
shareholders who wish to exercise their right to elect a new board through a
proxy contest.114
A proxy put is thus a change in control covenant, often in a loan
agreement, which typically gives the lender the right to demand redemption
of any or all of the outstanding debt on the occurrence of a fundamental
change, or a change in control.115 A change in control generally is defined
as an event by which
a majority of the members of the board of directors or other equivalent
governing body of the Company cease to be composed of individuals (i)
who were members of that board or equivalent governing body on the
first day of such period, (ii) whose election or nomination to that board or
equivalent governing body was approved by individuals referred to in
clause (i) above constituting at the time of such election or nomination at
least a majority of that board or equivalent governing body or (iii) whose
election or nomination to that board or other equivalent governing body
was approved by individuals referred to in clauses (i) and (ii) above
constituting at the time of such election or nomination at least a majority
of that board or equivalent governing body.116

These provisions make it more difficult for activist shareholders to change a
majority of the board, namely because any new director will be considered
noncontinuing,117 and if a majority becomes noncontinuing, there is a
change in control and the proxy put is triggered.118 Traditional proxy puts
allow the incumbent board to approve new directors, effectively rendering
110. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 2–3.
111. See id.
112. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 952–54; WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 3–4.
113. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 953.
114. See id.; Solomon, supra note 99.
115. See BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 1.
116. Davey & Kelly, supra note 13 (quoting San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v.
Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
117. Continuing directors are those directors who were either in office at the origination
of the debt agreement, or, in the case of traditional proxy puts, approved by a majority of the
incumbent directors that were in office at the time of the agreement. See id.
118. See id. The change in control often constitutes an event of default in these debt
agreements. See id.
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them continuing directors. They still, however, deter investors from waging
proxy contests out of a fear that the incumbent directors will not approve
the new slate.119
Proxy puts serve as a tool for management to ward off shareholder
activists’ momentum for change.120 Activist investors often lobby for
board seats, thus implicating the proxy put.121 In response to the significant
growth among these activists, more debt agreements are emerging with
proxy put provisions.122 Plaintiffs’ attorneys argue that the threat of a firm
having to refinance its debt as a result of a proxy put being triggered
discourages would-be activist investors from engaging with the
company.123
The Delaware Chancery Court recently addressed proxy puts, specifically
in situations where a shareholder activist buys a significant portion of an
underperforming company’s shares and then launches a proxy contest to
alter the majority of a board of directors.124 The court appeared skeptical of
proxy puts because of their entrenchment effects, though it has not
outlawed their use entirely.125 In two recent Delaware cases, analyzed in
Part II.A and II.B, the companies’ loan agreements included proxy put
provisions, which allowed the creditor to require repayment of the
companies’ outstanding debt if a majority of the boards became
noncontinuing.126 The proxy put provisions in these Delaware cases
allowed the shareholders to elect the new board—through a proxy contest
or otherwise—as long as the incumbent board approved the dissident
directors.127 This is a feature of the traditional proxy put that has been
eliminated in some credit agreements, the result of which creates a dead
hand feature.128

119. Liz Hoffman, Banks Feel the Heat from Lawsuits, WALL STREET J. (Apr. 28, 2015,
6:14 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/banks-feel-the-heat-from-lawsuits-1430259260?
alg=y [https://perma.cc/HF5L-264U].
120. See Solomon, supra note 99; supra Part I.A.2.
121. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 5–7 (discussing the Amylin case, where activist
investors Icahn and Eastbourne nominated a slate of directors who, if elected, would trigger
the proxy put).
122. See Hoffman, supra note 119.
123. Id.
124. See generally Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc., 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013); San
Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009);
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15.
125. See Amylin, 983 A.2d at 315; see also Kallick, 68 A.3d at 248 (stating that, given the
proxy put’s blatant entrenchment function, one would hope that the company not only put up
a hard bargain, but also receive a clear economic advantage in exchange for the provisions).
126. See infra Part II.A–B. If a majority of the board became noncontinuing, and the
lender chose to accelerate the debt under the agreement, the company would face disastrous
financial results as it attempted to refinance. See Camisha L. Simmons, Lenders & Directors
Beware of the Dead-Hand Proxy Put, AM. BANKR. INST. J., http://nebula.wsimg.com/
ac72391defcee29e597411f804d4c272?AccessKeyId=3B39241A60E84B884186&dispositio
n=0&alloworigin=1 (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/6UFB-9H8V].
127. See infra Part II.A–B.
128. See Simmons, supra note 126.

2962

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

3. Dead Hand Proxy Puts
Both commentators and the Delaware Chancery Court have criticized a
particular type of proxy put: the dead hand proxy put.129 This is because
these provisions prevent the incumbent board from neutralizing the put
even if they approve the dissident slate of directors.130 In other words,
regardless of the incumbent board’s approval of new directors, the new slate
will still be considered “noncontinuing”; thus the debtholder will have the
right to require the borrower to repurchase the debt.131 The language in
these provisions makes it nearly impossible for shareholders to change the
board of directors without triggering the proxy put.132
Dead hand proxy puts and traditional proxy puts generally define a
change in control the same way.133 However, the following parenthetical is
added to the traditional language:
[E]xcluding, in the case of both clause (ii) and clause (iii), any individual
whose initial nomination for, or assumption of office as, a member of that
board or equivalent governing body occurs as a result of an actual or
threatened solicitation of proxies or consents for the election or removal
of one or more directors by any person or group other than a solicitation
for the election of one or more directors by or on behalf of the board of
directors.134

These provisions exclude from the definition of “continuing director” those
whose nomination or assumption of office resulted from a proxy contest.135
This type of dead hand proxy put thus hinders the shareholders from
removing current board members and nominating a new slate of directors
through a proxy contest.136
As with traditional proxy puts, dead hand proxy puts also have become
more important to corporations and creditors in light of the current wave of
shareholder activism.137 Plaintiffs’ attorneys and other opponents of these
provisions argue that they serve as an entrenchment mechanism for
management and a restraint on the stockholder franchise.138 Nevertheless,
proponents of the dead hand feature argue that they are necessary for the

129. See generally Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15. See also infra Part II.
130. Simmons, supra note 126.
131. Id.
132. See F. William Reindel et al., Dead Hand Proxy Puts: What You Need to Know,
HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 10, 2015), http://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/10/dead-hand-proxy-puts-what-you-need-to-know/
[https://perma.cc/99JA-FYFR].
133. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
134. Davey & Kelly, supra note 13 (quoting San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v.
Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 309 (Del. Ch. 2009)).
135. See Simmons, supra note 126.
136. See id.
137. Hoffman, supra note 119.
138. See generally Verified Class Action Complaint, Stein v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., No.
11352 (Del. Ch. Jul 30, 2015); WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 3.
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proxy put to be effective.139 Further, they contend that the dead hand proxy
put serves a legitimate business interest, namely protecting creditors.140
C. The Poison Pill Defense Mechanism
In addition to the use of proxy puts, boards also adopt poison pill
provisions as a means to defend against unwanted change and hostile
takeovers. These provisions, like proxy puts, have developed over time to
include a dead hand feature. Dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy
puts have strikingly similar effects on both corporate boards and
shareholders.141 Part I.C.1 provides a background on poison pills—which
are currently legal in Delaware—while Part I.C.2 discusses dead hand and
no hand poison pills, which the Delaware courts have outlawed.
1. Poison Pills
During the 1980s, corporations developed defenses specifically designed
to ward off hostile takeovers.142 Poison pills are shareholder rights plans143
intended to make hostile takeovers difficult for the acquirer, “either by
making the acquisition poisonously expensive or by placing a bidder in a
lesser position vis-à-vis the other shareholders.”144 While in place, the
poison pill is an insurmountable barrier to a hostile takeover.145 Poison
pills can be implemented easily without a shareholder vote, and “[t]he only
way to counter a poison pill is to have it removed.”146
A board usually will adopt poison pills in an amendment to the
company’s bylaws.147 The terms of the poison pill generally authorize the
creation of new securities and “[r]ights to purchase those securities.”148
Both of these poison pills serve to dilute the value of the investment;
therefore, “acquirers are careful to avoid ‘swallowing’ the poison pill.”149
139. See Reindel et al., supra note 132; see also Kevin Miller, Food for Thought:
Conflicting Views on the “Knowing Participation” Element of Aiding & Abetting Claims, 9
DEAL LAW. 1, 1 (2015) (discussing the need for proxy puts to protect creditors).
140. See Hoffman, supra note 119; see also Part II.D.2 (discussing arguments in favor of
the use of dead hand proxy puts to protect creditors).
141. See infra Part III.
142. PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURING
153–54 (4th ed. 2007).
143. Poison pills are referred to as shareholder rights plans because the purpose of the
poison pill device is to distribute rights to shareholders, entitling them to purchase stock or
other securities upon a triggering event. See JAMES D. COX & THOMAS LEE HAZEN,
CORPORATE COUNSEL GUIDES: CORPORATION LAW § 23:7 (2012).
144. The Targets Strategy in a Multistep Acquisition, in CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS,
MERGERS, AND DIVESTITURES § 10:46 (2015).
145. See Velasco, supra note 80, at 382.
146. Id.
147. Charles M. Yablon, Poison Pills & Litigation Uncertainty, 1989 DUKE L.J. 54, 58.
148. Id. At the time the board adopts the shareholder rights plan, the rights lack
economic value and are not exercisable until the occurrence of a specified triggering event,
such as a merger or takeover. See Suzanne S. Dawson, Robert J. Pence & David S. Stone,
Poison Pill Defensive Measures, 42 BUS. LAW. 423, 423–24 (1987).
149. Jordan M. Barry & John William Hatfield, Pills & Partisans: Understanding
Takeover Defenses, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 633, 642–43 (2012).
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Generally, poison pills contain a provision that allows for the board of
directors to redeem the pill.150 If the board redeems the pill, the acquirer is
able to go through with the takeover without triggering the pill’s negative
consequences.151 If, however, the board will not redeem the pill, the
acquirer likely will attempt to replace a majority of the board through a
proxy contest.152 If successful, the new board will redeem the pill, and the
acquisition will occur without the dilutive effects of the poison pill being
triggered.153
The Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of the poison pill in
Moran v. Household International, Inc.154 Fearing a leveraged buyout,
Household International, Inc. amended its bylaws to include a shareholder
rights plan “as a preventive mechanism to ward off future advances.”155
The Moran court concluded that DGCL section 157 provides sufficient
authority for the board to adopt the rights plan.156 Specifically, section 157
provides the power to issue rights to purchase shares of capital stock.157
Moreover, the court found that the rights plan did not limit the voting power
of individual shareholders and had only a minimal effect on proxy
contests.158
2. Dead Hand Poison Pills and No Hand Poison Pills
As discussed above, a potential acquirer can wage a proxy contest to
elect a new board that is willing to redeem a poison pill, thus avoiding the
pill’s negative effects.159 To prevent such an election, boards gradually
altered poison pill provisions to create “dead hand” and “no hand” poison
pills.160 A dead hand provision requires that the poison pill be redeemed
only by “continuing directors,” defined as directors who were in place at the

150. See Dawson et al., supra note 148, at 427.
151. Barry & Hatfield, supra note 149, at 644.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). Household International was a diversified holding
company with subsidiaries in the financial services, transportation, and merchandising
industries. See id. at 1349.
155. Id. The rights plan provided that Household common stockholders were entitled to
the issuance of one right per common share if certain triggering events occurred. See id. at
1348. There were two triggering events written into the plan: the announcement of a tender
offer for 30 percent of Household’s shares and the acquisition of 20 percent of Household’s
shares. See id.
156. Id. at 1353. In addition to finding authority under section 157, the court also found
that the board had inherent authority, under DGCL section 141(a), to manage the
corporations business and affairs. Id.
157. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 157(a) (2011).
158. See Moran, 500 A.2d at 1355. The court explained that, despite the poison pill,
shareholders could still make a tender offer and bring a proxy contest. They might do this by
making the tender offer conditional on the rights being redeemed, or by forming a group to
purchase only 19.9 percent of the shares and solicit proxies for consent to remove the board
and redeem the rights. Id. at 1354.
159. See supra Part I.C.1.
160. Peter V. Letsou, Are Dead Hand (and No Hand) Poison Pills Really Dead?, 68 U.
CIN. L. REV. 1101, 1112–14 (2000); COX & HAZEN, supra note 143, § 23:7.
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time the pill was adopted, or are supported by those directors.161 A no hand
provision limits the board’s ability to redeem the pill once a majority of the
board has been replaced.162 These provisions provide that even successful
proxy contests, which replace an incumbent board with a new slate of
directors, will not prevent the pill from being triggered.163
The dead hand poison pill makes it even more difficult—indeed nearly
impossible—to use a proxy contest to gain control of the corporation’s
board for the purpose of redeeming the pill.164 In a takeover scenario, an
acquirer often tenders an offer to buy the outstanding shares of the target
and initiates a proxy contest to nominate a slate of directors who will
redeem the pill.165 With dead hand poison pills, electing a new slate of
directors will automatically trigger the poison pill because only continuing
directors may redeem the rights plan.166 Thus, where there is a dead hand
poison pill, shareholders are less likely to initiate proxy contests to elect
new board members.
In Carmody v. Toll Bros., Inc.,167 the Delaware Chancery Court
considered whether dead hand poison pills were subject to legal challenge
on the basis that they violated the DGCL and the fiduciary duties of the
board of directors.168 The court ultimately denied the defendants’ motion to
dismiss, finding that the dead hand rights plan was subject to legal
challenge on both statutory and fiduciary duty grounds.169
The Toll Brothers rights plan was adopted as a preemptive defensive
mechanism, in that it was not in response to any specific threat.170 What
distinguished the Toll Brothers rights plan from traditional poison pills was
a dead hand feature, which provided that “it authorizes only a specific,
defined category of directors—the ‘Continuing Directors’—to redeem the
Rights.”171
The court first concluded that the statutory claims were legally
cognizable on the grounds that they may have the effect of limiting the
board’s power conferred by DGCL section 141(a), which authorizes the
board to manage the business and affairs of the corporation.172 The court
referred to a New York Supreme Court case,173 which invalidated a similar
continuing director provision, on the basis that it “effectively limits the
161. Letsou, supra note 160, at 1103; Velasco, supra note 80, at 383–84.
162. See Letsou, supra note 160, at 1103.
163. See id. at 1114.
164. Id. at 1101–02.
165. See id. at 1101.
166. See id.
167. 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
168. See id. at 1182.
169. See id. at 1184–85. The motion did not focus on whether the rights plan was invalid,
but rather on whether the complaint stated a legally cognizable claim for invalidity. Id.
170. See id. at 1183.
171. Id. at 1184.
172. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2011). The statute states that “[t]he business and
affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed by or under the
direction of a board of directors.” Id.
173. Bank of N.Y. Co. v. Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
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powers of the future board.”174 Specifically, even if the stockholders
properly elect a new board but the incumbent board does not approve the
directors, the future board may not redeem the shares.175
The Chancery Court considered whether the plaintiffs had a valid claim
for breach of the duty of loyalty176 based on (1) the disenfranchisement of
shareholders’ rights and (2) the reasonableness of the adopted dead hand
defense mechanism.177 The complaint alleged that the dead hand provision
“purposefully disenfranchises the company’s shareholders without any
compelling justification” because the shareholders would be powerless to
elect a new board that would be willing and able to redeem the poison pill
and accept the bid.178 The court determined, while avoiding the merits, that
the complaint stated legally cognizable claims, in turn making it clear that
the adoption of the defensive mechanism could be coercive under Delaware
law and may represent a breach of statutory and fiduciary duties of the Toll
Brothers board.179
The Delaware Supreme Court in Quickturn Design Systems v. Shapiro180
explicitly reinforced the Toll Bros. ruling. Indeed, it went one step further
and openly invalidated the use of dead hand and no hand poison pill
provisions.181 In Quickturn, Mentor Graphics Corp., the hostile bidder,
wanted to acquire Quickturn, a publically traded company whose business
competed with Mentor’s.182 Mentor announced a tender offer for all
outstanding common shares of Quickturn and also announced that it
intended to solicit proxies to replace Quickturn’s board.183
Shortly after Mentor’s announcement, Quickturn amended its rights plan
to include a no hand, or delayed redemption, provision.184 “The [d]elayed
[r]edemption [p]rovision provide[d] that, if a majority of the directors are
replaced by stockholder action, the newly elected board cannot redeem the
rights for six months if the purpose or effect of the redemption would be to
facilitate a transaction with an [i]nterested [p]erson.”185
The Delaware Supreme Court concluded that the delayed redemption
plan was invalid because, similar to the dead hand poison pill, it deprived a
newly elected slate of directors from fulfilling its statutory duty to manage
174. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1191 (quoting Irving Bank Corp., 528 N.Y.S.2d at 484).
175. See id.
176. The duty of loyalty requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
and shareholders and demands that any director not only protect the corporations’ interests,
but also refrain from harming the corporation or its shareholders. Satisfying the duty of
loyalty requires a director to put the interests of the corporation and stockholders before his
or her private interests. See Randy J. Holland, Distinguished Jurist Lecture, Delaware
Directors’ Fiduciary Duties: The Focus on Loyalty, 11 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 675, 683 (2009).
177. See Toll Bros., 723 A.2d at 1189–90.
178. Id. at 1193.
179. Id. at 1182.
180. 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998).
181. Id. at 1292.
182. See id. at 1283.
183. See id. at 1285.
184. See id. at 1289.
185. Id. An interested person is defined as “a party that ‘directly or indirectly proposed,
nominated or financially supported’ the election of the new board.” Id. at 1290.
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the corporation under section 141(a), in addition to its fiduciary duties to
shareholders.186 Specifically, the court focused on section 141(a), finding
the delayed redemption provision invalid because it prevented the newly
elected board from having full discretion “to manage and direct the business
and affairs of a Delaware corporation.”187
Moreover, the delayed redemption plan limited the directors’ decisions
regarding management and prevented the new board from redeeming the
rights plan “to facilitate a transaction that would serve the stockholders best
interests, even under circumstances where the board would be required to
do so because of its fiduciary duty to the Quickturn stockholders.”188 As a
result, the Delaware Supreme Court invalidated the use of no hand delayed
redemption provisions, stating that no defensive measure that inhibits a
board from discharging its fiduciary duties can be sustained.189
II. DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS POPPING UP IN DELAWARE
Part II addresses the current litigation in the Delaware courts surrounding
the use of both proxy puts and dead hand proxy puts. Part II.A and II.B
provide an analysis of two recent cases involving traditional proxy puts.
Part II.C then discusses the most recent case, which involves the use of a
dead hand proxy put. Finally, Part II.D provides a discussion of the debate
regarding the legitimacy of these provisions, considering their effects on
stockholders, creditors, and management.
A. Reluctant Acceptance in San Antonio Fire & Police
Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
In San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharmaceuticals,
Inc., Amylin Pharmaceuticals faced a proxy contest initiated by two
investors seeking to replace a majority of the board of directors.190 The
change in the majority of the board, without the current board’s approval,
would trigger financially harmful provisions in Amylin’s indenture and
credit agreement.191 The issue in this case was “whether a commonplace
provision found in a trust indenture governing publically traded notes
prevents the issuer’s board of directors from ‘approving’ as ‘continuing
directors’ persons nominated by stockholders in opposition to the slate
nominated by the incumbent directors.”192

186. See id. at 1291–92.
187. Id. at 1292.
188. Id. at 1292–93.
189. Id. at 1293.
190. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharm., Inc., 983 A.2d 304,
307 (Del. Ch. 2009); supra note 8 and accompanying text.
191. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 306–07.
192. Id. at 306.
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1. The Proxy Put Provisions
The suit in Amylin arose out of a change in control provision in a 2007
note indenture adopted by the board.193 This indenture provided that
noteholders have the right to redeem any or all of their notes at face value
upon the occurrence of a “[f]undamental [c]hange.”194 It further defined a
fundamental change as occurring if “at any time the [c]ontinuing [d]irectors
do not constitute a majority of the [c]ompany’s [b]oard of [d]irectors.”195
At the time of the suit, the board was composed of twelve continuing
directors.196 The indenture agreement did allow for new directors to
become continuing if approved by the incumbent board and did not
explicitly contain dead hand language. However, the indenture trustee
argued for a reading with that effect.197
Amylin’s credit agreement also contained a continuing director’s
provision.198 In this agreement, a change in control199 triggered an event of
default, which accelerated the debt unless the provision was waived.200 The
change in control provision allowed for a change in the board’s composition
if the incumbent board approved them, unless the new nomination resulted
from an actual or threatened proxy contest.201 If both provisions were
triggered—those in the indenture and credit agreement—Amylin would be
forced to repay up to $915 million immediately.202
2. The Proxy Contest
The change in control provisions in the indenture and credit agreement
came to the attention of the shareholders in 2009, when Icahn Partners LP,
owner of 8.8 percent of outstanding Amylin shares, notified the company
that it would be nominating a slate of five directors.203 At the same time,
Eastbourne Capital, owner of 12.5 percent of Amylin’s shares, notified the
193. Id. at 307; see also Icahn, Amylin and the New Nuances of Activist Investing, supra
note 6 (explaining the facts giving rise to the lawsuit against Amylin).
194. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 307–08.
195. Id. Section 1.01 of the indenture defined continuing directors as:
(i) individuals who on the [i]ssue [d]ate constituted the [b]oard of [d]irectors and
(ii) any new directors whose election to the [b]oard of [d]irectors or whose
nomination for election by the stockholders of the [c]ompany was approved by at
least a majority of the directors then still in office (or a duly constituted committee
thereof) either who were directors on the [i]ssue [d]ate or whose election or
nomination for election was previously so approved.
Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 314–15.
198. See id. at 308–09.
199. See supra notes 116, 134 and accompanying text for the exact wording in the credit
agreement.
200. Amylin, 983 A.2d at 308.
201. See id. While not defined as such in the Amylin case, by the nature of its terms, this
provision was a dead hand proxy put.
202. Id. at 310 n.7.
203. Id. at 309. This nomination alone would not trigger the provisions because a change
of five directors would still leave the majority of the board continuing. Id.
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company of its intent to nominate another five directors.204 If ten new
directors were elected to the board, the provisions in both agreements
would be triggered, and the lenders would have the right to recall the
debt.205 Eastbourne questioned the legitimacy of the provisions and
requested that the board “remove any obstacle to the operation of the
stockholder franchise, including ‘approving’ the dissident slates for
purposes of the 2007 [n]otes and obtaining any necessary consents or
waivers from the lenders under the [c]redit [a]greement.”206
3. The Chancery Court Decision
The San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund (SAFPPF), an owner of
shares in Amylin, filed a class action suit against the company and its
individual directors.207 The claims against Amylin included: (1) breaches
of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by adopting the credit agreement
and indentures, (2) breaches of the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty by
failing to approve the nominated slate of directors, and (3) breaches of the
fiduciary duties of care and loyalty in disclosing the risks presented by the
continuing directors provisions in Amylin’s annual report.208 SAFPPF had
also brought suit against Bank of America, the underwriter of the credit
agreement, for aiding and abetting the breach of fiduciary duties.209 The
court recognized the restrictive nature of the language in the credit
agreement, which specifically excluded approval for directors appointed
through a proxy contest.210 However, because the claims were settled out
of court through an agreement between Amylin and Bank of America, the
court did not provide a remedy for the credit agreement’s dead hand
provisions.211
The Chancery Court then addressed whether the Amylin board had both
the power and right, under the indenture, to approve the dissident slate of
directors.212 The Chancery Court ultimately concluded that, regardless of
whether the Amylin board endorsed or recommended the dissident slate of
directors, the board retained the power to approve them.213 Thus, it held
that the board may approve the nominated directors, while simultaneously
supporting and endorsing their own slate.214 The court proclaimed that the
board has the right to approve the stockholder nominees if the board
204. Id.
205. See id. at 309–10.
206. Id. at 310.
207. Id.
208. Id. The parties decided to settle some of the claims outside of court. As part of
these settlement negotiations, Eastbourne and Icahn agreed to reduce the number of
nominated directors. As a result, no more than five stockholder-nominated directors would
have been elected. With less than a majority of the board changing, the continuing director
provisions would not be triggered. Id.
209. Id. at 311.
210. Id.
211. Davey & Kelly, supra note 13.
212. Amylin, 938 A.2d at 312.
213. Id. at 314.
214. Id.
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determines, in good faith, that the newly approved directors would not
materially harm the company.215
Thus, the court rejected the indenture trustee’s interpretation, which
would have denied the incumbent board the flexibility of approving the
slate of new directors without endorsing them. This interpretation of the
provision would have effectively written in dead hand language that would
prohibit any change in the majority of the board as a result of any contested
elections for the life of the indenture agreement. The court recognized that
preventing any election of stockholder nominees resulting from a proxy
contest might serve as a prohibited entrenchment mechanism for the
incumbent board.216
The Chancery Court expressed skepticism toward indentures that do not
allow the current board to both approve the new directors and stop the
proxy put from being triggered.217 It stated, “Provision[s] so strongly in
derogation of the stockholders’ franchise rights would likely put the trustee
and noteholders on constructive notice of the possibility of its ultimate
unenforceability.”218 The court also noted that if such a constricting
provision did exist, the board would need to prove that, in exchange, it was
obtaining extraordinary economic value for the corporation that was
otherwise unavailable.219 The Amylin court suggested that provisions with
such “eviscerating effect[s] on the stockholder franchise” might raise
serious concerns regarding the board’s exercise of its fiduciary duties, as
well as the degree to which the provision might be unenforceable as against
public policy.220
Thus, the Chancery Court did not outlaw proxy puts or continuing
director provisions in Amylin. However, the court was highly skeptical of
those provisions that would leave the board without the ability to prevent
the triggering of a proxy put.221 The court interpreted the indenture to
avoid such a restrictive view of the board’s ability to approve a new slate of
directors.222 Moreover, the court put borrowers and lenders on notice that
provisions with restrictive dead hand features may, ultimately, be
unenforceable.223
B. Requiring Substantial Risk:
Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc.
Kallick v. Sandridge Energy, Inc.224 also involved a proxy contest to
change the makeup of the board of directors of Sandridge Energy.225 TPG215. Id. at 313. At this stage in the suit, the Amylin board had already agreed to approve
the dissident slate of directors, as long as the court allowed it to do so. Id.
216. Id. at 314–15.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 315 n.32.
219. Id. at 315.
220. Id.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013).

2016]

OUTLAWING DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS

2971

Axon, a hedge fund holding 7 percent of Sandridge shares, wished to destagger the Sandridge board.226 Gerald Kallick, another Sandridge
shareholder, supported the TPG-Axon proxy solicitation and brought claims
alleging breach of fiduciary duty against the Sandridge board.227 The issue
in this case, again, arose out of a proxy put that would be triggered if a
majority of Sandridge’s board changed.228 If the shareholders chose to
elect a new slate of directors, the proxy put would cause $4.3 billion worth
of Sandridge notes to become due.229 At the time of the litigation, the
incumbent board had left the slate of directors nominated by TPG-Axon
unapproved and took the position that even if the debt came due,
Sandridge’s financial position would not be jeopardized.230
1. The Proxy Put Provision
The Sandridge note indentures included a change of control provision,
which, when triggered, would require Sandridge to offer to repurchase its
existing debt.231 This provision, although entrenching on the board if they
refused to approve the new slate of directors, did not contain a dead hand
feature. As a result, the incumbent board had the ability to “neutralize the
effect of the [p]roxy [p]ut by ‘approving’ the TPG-Axon slate of directors,
in accordance with the terms of the indentures.”232

225. Id. at 244.
226. Id. The staggered board was implemented via the company’s bylaws. Therefore, it
could be changed by stockholder vote. Id. A staggered board “is a governance practice in
which only a fraction (typically a third) of the members of the board of directors is elected
each year, rather than all at once.” Definition of Staggered Board, FIN. TIMES, http://
lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=staggered-board (last visited Apr. 29, 2015) [https://perma.cc/
M4EE-VQNX]. Staggered boards are known as a takeover defense mechanism because they
increase the amount of time a hostile bidder has to wait to replace a majority of the board.
See id.
227. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 245.
228. Id. at 244.
229. Id. at 245.
230. Id. Originally, the incumbent board warned shareholders that triggering the proxy
put was risky. See id. However, the board then claimed that, because the notes were trading
above the repurchase price set in the indenture, debtholders were not likely to require
payment at a below-market price. See id.
231. Id. at 244. The notes state that a change in control occurs
if, during any period of two consecutive years, individuals who at the beginning of
such period constituted the [b]oard of [d]irectors of the [c]ompany or any
[s]uccessor [p]arent (together with any new directors whose election to such board
or whose nomination for election by the stockholders of the [c]ompany or any
[s]uccessor [p]arent, as the case may be, was approved by a vote of 66 2/3% of the
directors then still in office who were either directors at the beginning of such
period or whose election or nomination for election was previously so approved),
cease for any reason to constitute a majority of such [b]oard of [d]irectors then in
office.
Id. at 250 (emphasis omitted).
232. Id.
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2. The Proxy Contest
The proxy put came to the attention of stockholders after TPG-Axon filed
its preliminary consent solicitation statement.233 TPG-Axon initiated the
solicitation after a disappointing performance following the company’s
initial public offering.234 TPG-Axon demanded that the board be
declassified and that it investigate alternative strategies intended to
The Sandridge board warned the
maximize shareholder value.235
stockholders that under the terms of its senior notes, any change in control
would require the company to pay back its outstanding debt.236
3. The Chancery Court Decision
Kallick, favoring the change requested by TPG-Axon, brought suit and
argued that the board breached its fiduciary duties in refusing to approve the
slate nominated by TPG.237 The Chancery Court applied the intermediate
standard of review expressed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.238
This standard in effect removes director self-interest from the equation,
because the board is required to justify their actions as reasonable.239 The
incumbent board argued that the business judgment rule should apply to its
decision not to approve the board of directors.240 The court, however,
found that in “situations where board[s] of directors make decisions that
233. Id. A consent solicitation is a statement mailed to shareholders, in lieu of an annual
meeting, asking them to vote for a specific change to the company. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 211(b) (2011). TPG-Axon’s consent solicitation, in this case, requested that shareholders
send back the consent card in favor of its proposal to amend the company’s bylaws and
replace the entire board with a new slate of qualified directors. See Martinne Geller,
UPDATE 2-TPG-Axon Moves Ahead with Plan to Oust SandRidge Board, CHI. TRIB.:
REUTERS (Dec. 24, 2012), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-12-24/news/sns-rt-tpgaxon-sandridgeboard-update-2l1e8no4hg-20121224_1_sandridge-energy-tpg-axonsandridge-shares [https://perma.cc/84YW-VADU].
234. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 249.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 250.
237. Id. at 245.
238. 493 A.2d 946 (1985). In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, in the
context of takeovers, the business judgment rule does not apply to a board’s decision
“[b]ecause of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own
interest, rather than those of the corporation.” Id. at 954. Instead, the court should apply a
heightened standard, which involves a two-part test. First, the directors must show that they
had reasonable grounds for believing that a threat to the corporation existed. Id. Next, the
board must show that the defensive measure adopted was reasonable in relation to the threat
posed. Id. at 955.
239. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 259. Kallick argued for the Blasius standard of review, which
requires greater scrutiny than Unocal. See id. at 258. The court rejected this argument
because the board’s refusal to accept the new slate of directors was not “taken for the sole or
primary purpose of thwarting a shareholder vote.” Id. (citing Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas
Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988)). The Blasius standard of review requires the
board to demonstrate a compelling justification for its actions. See Blasius, 564 A.2d at 661;
Stephen Byeff, Note, The Spirit of Blasius: Sandridge As an Antidote to the Poison Put, 115
COLUM. L. REV. 375, 409–15 (2015) (arguing that the Chancery Court should have applied
the Blasius standard of review).
240. Kallick, 68 A.3d at 257.
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have clear implications for their continued control,” Unocal applies as an
“equitable tool[] to protect stockholders against unreasonable director
action that has a defensive or entrenching effect.”241
Applying Unocal, the Chancery Court held that the Sandridge board
failed to provide a reasonable justification for refusing to approve the
board; therefore, the incumbent board’s actions represented a violation of
its fiduciary duty of loyalty.242 The court found that, consistent with
Amylin, a board violates its fiduciary duties when it fails to approve a
dissident slate simply because it is running against the incumbent board.243
The board must uphold the duty of loyalty and decline to approve a
nominated slate of directors only if those candidates would pose “a material
threat of harm to the corporation.”244 Here, the incumbent board could not
identify a substantial risk in approving the nominated board, and approving
the directors would not have been a breach of a contractual duty of good
faith and fair dealing to creditors.245 As a result, the court held that the
incumbent board was obliged to approve the new directors, regardless of its
opinion that they were not as qualified.246 In other words, the board’s
decision could not rest on the idea that “[they] are better than the new guys
and gals, so keep [them] in office.”247
The Chancery Court’s decision in Sandridge reaffirms the standard of
review for directors’ actions in contests for corporate control, while also
providing that a board of directors has an affirmative fiduciary duty to
neutralize a proxy put, unless doing so would pose a substantial risk to the
company or its creditors.248 The Chancery Court also noted its concern, as
it did in Amylin, with directors receiving substantial economic value for
putting these provisions into credit agreements and suggested that
independent directors should police their use to mitigate their entrenching
effects.
C. A Figurative Sword of Damocles:
Pontiac General Employees Retirement System v. Ballantine
The most recent discussion of dead hand proxy puts emerged in Pontiac
General Employees Retirement System v. Ballantine249 (Healthways). The
case arose out of a loan agreement between Healthways, Inc. and SunTrust
241. Id. at 258 (citing Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954–55).
242. Id.
243. Id. at 246.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 260–61.
247. Id. at 255.
248. See id. at 260–61. The court recognized that it should take into account, in a limited
fashion, the effect that approving the slate of directors would have on creditors. See id. at
260. However, the directors were under no obligation to place a greater emphasis on
creditors’ interests when deciding whether to approve the directors for purposes of the proxy
put. See id. at 260 n.95.
249. No. 9789-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 14, 2014). Although the court denied the defendants’
motion to dismiss, the parties ultimately settled the case out of court. See Simmons, supra
note 126.
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Bank.250 The agreement originally contained a continuing director proxy
put, with no dead hand feature.251 Under this agreement, the incumbent
board had the ability to approve a dissident slate of directors to prevent the
acceleration of the outstanding debt with SunTrust.252 After stockholders
pressured Healthways to declassify its board, but before a proxy contest
was threatened or initiated, the board and SunTrust amended the loan
agreement to contain a dead hand feature.253 Healthways continued to face
stockholder dissatisfaction, and North Tide Capital, owner of 11 percent of
Healthways, expressed its intent to wage a proxy contest to gain
representation on the board.254 Shortly thereafter, Pontiac General
Employees Retirement System (PGER), a beneficial owner of Healthways,
made a 220 demand255 to inspect the company’s books and records and
found nothing to suggest that Healthways received “‘extraordinarily
valuable economic benefits’ that might justify the proxy put.”256
1. The Dead Hand Proxy Put
PGER then challenged the change in control provision in the 2012
amended agreement,257 which included dead hand language meant to
prevent a change in control resulting from proxy solicitations.258 The

250. See Simmons, supra note 126; see also Davey & Kelly, supra note 13 (explaining
the agreement between Healthways and SunTrust).
251. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 69–70.
252. Id. at 30–31 (discussing the additional amendment, which added the dead hand
language to the agreement).
253. Id. at 68–69.
254. Id. at 70–71. North Tide ultimately came to a resolution with Healthways and
gained board seats without waging the proxy contest. Id. Therefore, this appointment did not
trigger the dead hand provision of the proxy put.
255. DGCL section 220 provides that any stockholder, upon stating his or her proper
purpose, has a right to inspect the books and records of the corporation. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 220 (2011).
256. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 71.
257. “Change in control” is triggered in the 2012 loan agreement by a number of different
events, including when, “during [a] period of 24 consecutive months, a majority of the
members of the board of directors . . . of the [b]orrower cease to be composed of individuals
who are [c]ontinuing [d]irectors.” Id. at 6.
258. Id. The dead hand language appears in the definition of continuing directors, which
the court paraphrases from the 2012 loan agreement:
Continuing directors means, “. . . with respect to any period . . . individuals (A)
who were members of the board . . . of the [b]orrower on the first day of such
period, (B) whose election or nomination to that board . . . was approved by
individuals referred to in clause (A) . . . or (C) whose election or nomination to
that board . . . was approved by individuals referred to in clauses (A) and (B)
above constituting at the time of such election or nomination at least a majority of
[the] board or equivalent governing body.”
Id. The definition includes the following dead hand language:
[E]xcluding, in the case of both clauses (B) and (C), any individual whose initial
nomination for, or assumption of office as, a member of that board or equivalent
governing body occurs as a result of an actual or threatened solicitation of proxies
or consents for the election or removal of one or more directors by any person or
group other than a solicitation for the election of one or more directors by or on
behalf of the board.
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provision provided that a change of control would constitute an event of
default, giving the creditors the right to redeem their debt.259 The loan
agreement did, however, provide that the board could approve a dissident
slate of directors, in which case the new directors would constitute
continuing directors and the proxy put would not be triggered.260 However,
it made an exception for directors nominated pursuant to a proxy contest.261
Directors nominated pursuant to a proxy solicitation would remain
noncontinuing even if the board approved them.262 Thus, their nomination
still would constitute a change in control, and the directors would be left
powerless to stop the proxy put from being triggered.
2. Claims Against Healthways for Breach of Fiduciary Duties
In Healthways, the Chancery Court considered claims against both
Healthways and SunTrust, the lending institution that wrote the provision
into the loan agreement.263 The court found that, specific to this case, the
claim against the board for a breach of fiduciary duty in adopting the
provision was ripe.264 The dead hand proxy put was adopted in the wake of
increased “stockholder opposition[] and identified insurgency.”265
Moreover, because the company had traditionally not included dead hand
provisions in its agreement, the court was skeptical of the change in
historical practice of the company’s debt and the lack of evidence
suggesting that there was informed consideration for the amendment.266
The court thus found that the dispute was sufficiently ripe as to the entry of
the proxy put into the credit agreement because “the stockholders of the
company are presently suffering a distinct injury in the form of the deterrent
effect.”267
Moreover, the court spelled out the negative implications of dead hand
proxy puts, consistent with the skeptical views expressed in Amylin and
Sandridge. The court expressed distaste regarding their impact on the
stockholder franchise and the status of the board of directors.268 Moreover,

Id. at 6–7. This dead hand provision was added in the fifth amendment and did not exist in
the prior loan agreements. Id. at 6.
259. Id. at 6–7.
260. See id.
261. See id. at 7.
262. See id. (describing the dead hand language in the credit agreement).
263. See Davey & Kelly, supra note 13. The Chancery Court declined to dismiss the
stockholder challenge of the dead hand proxy put on ripeness grounds, finding that including
a dead hand provision in the agreement may have caused present injury to the stockholders.
Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 71.
264. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 77. The court explained that whether
a dispute is ripe hinges on a practical assessment of “whether the interests of the party
seeking relief outweigh the concerns of the Court in postponing review until the question
arises in some more concrete and final form.” Id. at 72.
265. Id. at 76.
266. Id. at 75–76.
267. Id. at 78. The court explained that Delaware courts have consistently found that
disputes are ripe when there is a stockholder deterrent effect. Id. at 73.
268. Id. at 79–80.
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the court recognized the deterrent effect on a shareholder’s decision to run a
proxy contest, regardless of whether the proxy contest was already
underway.269 The court noted that the proxy put creates a “Sword of
Damocles”270 situation, because the shareholders will have the negative
implications of the proxy put hanging over them when deciding to elect a
new board.271 The court further noted the “recognized entrenching effect”
that the dead hand provision had on the board and the restraint on the
stockholder franchise.272
The Delaware Chancery Court associated the dead hand proxy put with
the dead hand poison pill in Toll Bros.273:
The problem in Toll Brothers was that a rights plan containing a dead
hand feature in a pill would have a chilling effect on, among other things,
potential proxy contests such that the stockholders would be deterred,
they would have the Sword of Damocles hanging over them, when they
were deciding what to do with respect to a proxy contest.274

Bringing the point home, the court further explained: “That’s exactly what
the effect is of the dead hand proxy put in this case.”275 The Toll Bros.
court held that the deterrent effect of the poison pill, despite the fact that
there was no proxy contest underway, created a legally cognizable claim.276
In observing that the dead hand proxy put had the same deterrent effect as
the dead hand poison pill, the Healthways court used Toll Bros. as a basis
for denying the defendants’ motion to dismiss.277
3. Claims Against SunTrust for Aiding and Abetting
The court also considered Pontiac’s claim against SunTrust for aiding
and abetting the directors’ breach of fiduciary duty.278 SunTrust argued
that it had legitimate business reasons for wanting the protection afforded
by the dead hand provision.279 It further argued that one of the main
reasons for including the provision was that, as a lender, it always wanted to
know its borrower.280 The court, however, was skeptical of the creditor’s
legitimate business interests and was not willing to dismiss the aiding and
abetting claim.281 The court reasoned that this made little sense in the
269. Id. at 80.
270. “Sword of Damocles” is an expression used to illustrate that there is “an impending
disaster.” Sword of Damocles, MERRIAM WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/sword%20of%20Damocles (last visited Apr. 29, 2016) [https://perma.cc/F7VGER5C]. The expression refers to the legend of Damocles, servile courtier to King Dionysius
I of Syracuse, who was forced to sit under a sword that hung by a single hair. Id.
271. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 73.
272. Id. at 80.
273. See id. at 74; Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998).
274. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 74.
275. Id.
276. See supra Part I.C.2.
277. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 74–75.
278. Id. at 78–80.
279. See id. at 25–26.
280. Id. at 26.
281. Id. at 81.
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context of publically held companies that have annual board elections and
frequent CEO turnovers.282 Furthermore, in the wake of Amylin and
Sandridge, the court concluded that SunTrust was on notice that proxy puts,
including those with a dead hand feature, were suspect due to their negative
impact on the stockholder franchise and their management entrenchment
effect.283
The court also noted that bondholders have a right to enter into “arm’slength transaction[s]” in which they bargain for protection.284 However, it
suggested that there are other ways for creditors to receive protection
without using a mechanism that has such an entrenching effect on
management.285 These include raising interest rates or demanding that the
company obtain certain favorable financial metrics.
The dead hand proxy put in Healthways created the same effect that the
Amylin court categorized as overly restrictive, entrenching on management,
and debilitating to the stockholder franchise. The Delaware Chancery
Court previously had expressed distaste for these provisions, which put
such grave restrictions on the board’s ability to approve new directors who
are appointed by means of a proxy contest.286 However, the court has yet to
provide a per se legal analysis declaring their invalidity or limiting the use
of proxy puts to those that do not include dead hand provisions.
D. The Debate Surrounding Dead Hand Proxy Puts
This section discusses the varying uses and effects of dead hand proxy
puts. These proxy puts have an impact on shareholders, management, and
creditors. Each of these parties plays a significant role in defending or
denouncing the use of proxy puts. Part II.D.1 discusses how dead hand
proxy puts effect shareholders. Part II.D.2 focuses on how dead hand proxy
puts affect management. Finally, Part II.D.3 addresses their impact on
creditors.
1. The Stockholder Franchise
Dead hand proxy puts have a significant impact on stockholders’ rights,
including their ability to wage a successful proxy contest.287 Plaintiffs’
attorneys argue that these provisions have the purpose and effect of
coercing stockholders and preventing proxy contests.288 Because the

282. Id. 25–26.
283. Id. at 80.
284. Id. at 32.
285. Id. at 34. The court distinguished the proxy put as “very different from a purely
economic provision” because of the entrenching effects on management.” Id.
286. See generally Kallick v. Sandridge, 68 A.3d 242 (Del. Ch. 2013); San Antonio Fire
& Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms. Inc., 983 A.2d 304 (Del. Ch. 2009).
287. WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4.
288. See Verified Class Action Complaint, supra note 138, at 2, 13 (arguing that the risk
of having to repay debt because of the dead hand proxy put has a coercive effect on the
shareholders willingness to campaign for removal of the current board and to vote for
directors of their own choice).

2978

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 84

company’s debt will become due if a majority of the board is elected
through a proxy contest, attorneys and commentators argue that
stockholders are less likely to remove the board through proxy
solicitation.289 If stockholders go through with the proxy contest, this will
force the company to refinance its debt or renegotiate with its lenders to
waive the provision.290 If unable to refinance or renegotiate, the company
will face detrimental financial consequences, including the potential for a
liquidity crisis.291 Because shareholders will not likely exercise their right
to vote for new directors if it means financial insolvency for the company,
the dead hand proxy put effectively protects incumbent boards from
removal and has “eviscerating effect[s] on the stockholder franchise.”292
Indeed, the Chancery Court in Healthways recognized the potential
negative effects that dead hand proxy puts could have on the shareholders’
ability to threaten or initiate a proxy contest.293 It explained that
prohibiting or deterring proxy contests can result in stockholder
disenfranchisement because the presence of dead hand proxy puts promotes
fear over changing the board of directors.294 With the dead hand
mechanisms in place, shareholders likely will choose not to vote out an
incumbent board because new directors will be powerless to redeem the
dead hand proxy put.
2. The Entrenchment Effect
In adopting dead hand proxy puts, creditors and directors also entrench
incumbent directors, while appearing to serve a legitimate business
purpose.295 Commentators suggest that “management is active in placing
poison put covenants in indenture agreements for the purpose of
entrenchment.”296 Furthermore, managers have substantial control over
placing these provisions in debt agreements.297 As a result, management
has the opportunity to adopt provisions that are self-serving and contrary to
the interests of the corporation, the shareholders, or lenders.298
On more than one occasion, the Delaware Chancery Court has taken the
opportunity to note the “recognize[ed] entrenching effect” of dead hand
proxy puts.299 The court is skeptical of the provisions because they insulate

289. See id.; WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4–5.
290. See supra Part I.B.3.
291. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 2.
292. San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304,
315 (Del. Ch. 2009).
293. See Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 74.
294. Id.
295. See WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4.
296. Id.; see also Solomon, supra note 99.
297. Arlen & Talley, supra note 93, at 597; see supra Part I.B.1. Proxy puts, as discussed
above, are embedded defenses that prove difficult to regulate because they are implemented
without shareholder oversight. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 947.
298. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 954.
299. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 80; see also San Antonio Fire &
Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304, 306 (Del. Ch. 2009) (proposing
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directors from proxy contests, preventing stockholders from changing
management.300 The court, however, has recognized that there are other
purposes to the proxy put provisions and has suggested that “independent
directors . . . monitor poison puts to ensure that they are not being adopted
solely as entrenchment devices.”301 Bargaining to exclude them, and
accepting them only in exchange for significant economic value, may
provide sufficient evidence that the board did not adopt the provision for
the purpose of entrenchment.302
Opponents of both traditional proxy puts and dead hand proxy puts argue
that these “director-centric poison puts” are more about entrenching
incumbent board members than addressing the concerns of lending
institutions.303 They further argue that proxy puts, used as hostile control
change covenants, do not take into account whether bond values are
adversely affected by a change in control.304 Instead, they “reflect[] an
unabashed pursuit of management’s parochial interests.”305 Thus, these
covenants arguably protect management, conferring only an incidental
benefit on bondholders.306 Moreover, in some instances bond values are
likely to improve if an inefficient board is replaced in a proxy contest.307
Yet, the provisions in the hostile control change covenants prevent this
improvement by limiting shareholders’ ability to remove management.308
Management, in those instances, is protected at the expense of the
bondholders.309
Poison puts, as well as dead hand proxy puts, generally also may
entrench management by deterring acquisition activity.310 In a recent study
conducted at the University of Delaware, scholars found that “firms that had
bonds with poison puts are less likely to be either acquirers or targets” of an
acquisition.311 However, firms are more likely to include poison puts in
that a dead hand provision in the indenture would serve as a possible entrenchment
mechanism).
300. See supra Part II.A–C.
301. BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 3 (referring to Kallick v. Sandridge Energy,
Inc., 68 A.3d. 242 (Del. Ch. 2013)).
302. See id.
303. See Solomon, supra note 99; see also WHISSEL supra note 18, at 3 (stating that the
utility of proxy puts is almost entirely based on their ability to entrench management).
304. WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 954.
305. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 954.
306. WHISSEL, supra note 18, at 4; Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 954–55.
307. Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 954.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. See BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 5 (discussing the inevitable
entrenchment effect that results because poison puts reduce acquisition activity); see also
Part I.B.2.
311. BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 5. The empirical study considered the terms
“proxy puts” and “poison puts” synonymously, referring to the proxy puts in both the Amylin
and Sandridge cases as poison puts. Id. at 1–3. Additionally, the study considered poison
puts with triggering events, such as when “any person or group acquires 50 [percent] or more
of the issuer’s voting stock,” as well as a proxy put with a triggering event, such as “any time
the majority of the board of directors ceases to be those who were directors at the time of
issuance.” Id. at 1 n.1.
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debt agreements if they are in industries associated with acquisition activity
and are less likely to issue poison puts if they have other antitakeover
provisions in place.312 “[P]oison puts are used by firms in consolidating
industries that wish to avoid acquisition activity in general, which
admittedly could also reflect an entrenchment effect.”313 These scholars
acknowledged the entrenchment effect that is associated with fewer
acquisitions, yet ultimately concluded that the use of proxy puts is primarily
driven by bondholders’ efficient contracting considerations.314
3. Legitimate Business Concerns: The Lending Institutions
As noted above, dead hand proxy puts are contractual agreements
involving third party creditors.315 Boards of directors include a change in
control provision in a credit agreement or indenture in the form of a proxy
put after negotiation with the contracting parties. Commentators argue that
because a proxy put is not unilaterally adopted by the board of directors, but
rather negotiated with a third party in protection of that third party’s rights,
the proxy put serves a legitimate business purpose.316
With the rise of hedge fund activism, lending institutions have
increasingly bargained to include proxy put provisions in their agreements
to protect against activists.317 Since the beginning of 2014, nearly two
hundred companies have struck new loan agreements that include these
provisions.318 Lenders arguably bargain for these provisions to protect
against “debt-financed buybacks, dividends, and restructurings, favored by
such [activist] investors, which deteriorate credit.”319 With the surge of
shareholder activism targeting corporate boardrooms, banks argue that
proxy puts protect them from dissident directors who are focusing on shortterm goals that are inconsistent with the goals of the banks.320 “A few
years ago, [the proxy put] wasn’t necessarily front of mind for most boards
or lenders, but with the level of activism we’re seeing today, that has
changed.”321
Moreover, commentators also argue that the dead hand proxy put serves
the legitimate commercial interest of a bank wanting to know its borrower
because “[c]reditor’s don’t want to wake up one day and find out someone
else is driving the train.”322 Knowing the borrower ensures confidence that
business strategy will remain constant over the life of the credit

312. Id. at 12–13.
313. Id. at 6.
314. See id. at 22; infra Part II.D.2.
315. See supra Part II.D.3.
316. See Davey & Kelly, supra note 13; Hoffman, supra note 119.
317. See Hoffman, supra note 119.
318. Id.
319. BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 3.
320. See Reindel et al., supra note 132.
321. Hoffman, supra note 119 (quoting an attorney who heads the shareholder activism
group at Vinson & Elkins LLP).
322. Id.; see also Reindel et al., supra note 132.
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agreement.323 Essentially, the banks want to know who they are dealing
with and want to avoid lending money to a board of directors that is shortly
thereafter ousted for a new slate of directors with a completely different
strategy for the company.324 Creditors argue that the dead hand provisions
are the only way of providing them with the certainty of knowing that if a
company’s board changes, they can get out of the debt agreement.325
In the University of Delaware study discussed above, the results showed
that including proxy puts in credit agreements was evidence of efficient
contracting on the part of bondholders.326 The study found that a firm’s use
of poison puts corresponded with its use of other related covenants, such as
bond rating decline covenants, “likely reflecting bondholders with
legitimate concerns related to acquisitions and risk shifting.”327 Finally, the
results of this study also showed that firms that issue debt with poison puts
have significantly higher institutional ownership, as opposed to
individual.328 The researchers concluded that this evidenced “stronger
external monitors—again, an explanation that is consistent with a
governance structure complemented by contractual protections for
bondholders . . . and inconsistent with weak governance and/or managerial
entrenchment.”329
However, another empirical test analyzing the function of change in
control covenants in bond agreements concluded otherwise.330 Marcel
Kahan and Michael Klausner found that hostile change in control
covenants, strictly triggered by proxy contests or hostile acquisition, can
offer substantially less protection to bondholders than covenants that are
triggered purely by a ratings decline.331 They argued that a ratings decline
covenant, moreover, does not discriminate between actions that
management favors or disfavors.332 While recognizing that ratings decline
covenants are not a perfect fix, Kahan and Klausner concluded that pure
ratings decline covenants “provide the most complete coverage of events
that threaten bondholders and reflect no intrusion of managerial selfinterest.”333

323. See Reindel et al., supra note 132.
324. See Solomon, supra note 99.
325. See Hoffman, supra note 119.
326. See BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 21.
327. Id.
328. Id. at 14–15. Sixty-four percent of poison put firms are owned by institutional
investors, as compared with fifty-nine percent for firms that do not use poison puts in their
debt. Id.
329. Id. at 15.
330. See Kahan & Klausner, supra note 89, at 959.
331. Id.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 960; see also Coffee, supra note 102, at 1520 (stating that the most obvious
protection for bondholders from event risk is not a poison put, but “an upward interest rate
shift in the event of a rating downgrading”).
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III. DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS ARE INVALID
AS A MATTER OF DGCL
The legal confusion over dead hand proxy puts has caused an increase in
litigation against both corporations and lending institutions. In the wake of
Healthways, plaintiffs’ attorneys continue to bring actions on behalf of
shareholders, arguing that they are negatively affected by the use of dead
hand proxy puts in credit agreements.334 Dead hand proxy puts are
strikingly similar in effect to dead hand and no hand poison pills, which
have been outlawed by the Delaware courts.335
A comparative analysis of dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy
puts provides a basis for suggesting that the Delaware Chancery Court
outlaw dead hand proxy puts. While there are recognizable differences in
the two defense mechanisms, they have similar implications for
shareholders’ ability to wage proxy contests, which result in management
entrenchment. Moreover, both ultimately have inhibiting effects on boards
of directors’ ability to carry out their obligations under DGCL section 141.
In light of these concerns, Part III explains the similarities and differences
between the two mechanisms and argues that dead hand proxy puts should
be invalidated on the same grounds that the court used in Quickturn to
invalidate no hand and dead hand poison pills.336
A. Dead Hand Proxy Puts Vs. Dead Hand Poison Pills
This part discusses the similarities and differences between dead hand
proxy puts and dead hand poison pills. Part III.A.1 discusses the similar
purpose of the defense mechanisms, while Part III.A.2 focuses on their
similar effects on the stockholder franchise. Part III.A.3 and III.A.4 discuss
the similar effect on management and ultimately argue for the illegalization
of dead hand proxy puts in Delaware.
1. A Similar Purpose: Takeover Defense
When comparing dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy puts, it is
important to consider whether the two defense mechanisms serve the same
purpose. The dead hand poison pill is a shareholder rights plan that a
company adopts in connection with the threat of a tender offer or as a
predefensive measure.337 The purpose and effect of the poison pill is to
thwart hostile bidders.338 However, the dead hand proxy put recently has
been used to ward off shareholder activists who want to make a change to
the company but not acquire it.339
While dead hand proxy puts serve as a defense against shareholder
activism, these change in control provisions also function as a takeover
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.

See Hoffman, supra note 119.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C.2.
See supra Part I.C; Velasco, supra note 80, at 381–84.
See Solomon, supra note 99; supra Part I.B.2.

2016]

OUTLAWING DEAD HAND PROXY PUTS

2983

defense mechanism.340 Empirical evidence suggests that proxy puts are
more prevalent in industries that are prone to takeovers, yet firms with
proxy puts are less likely to be acquired.341 Moreover, firms with proxy
puts are less likely to also have poison pills.342 This indicates that firms
likely believe that proxy puts and poison pills serve a similar function, and
management may use them interchangeably to serve the same purpose.
Traditional poison puts, as discussed above, often include language that
specifically prevents a hostile takeover.343 While dead hand proxy puts
generally do not include such language, these proxy puts nevertheless deter
hostile takeovers, even if that is not their explicit purpose. For example,
imagine a corporate raider makes a tender offer, but the company has a dead
hand proxy put in place. Now imagine that the same corporate raider had
the intention of changing the board of directors, by means of a proxy
contest, to reflect his own strategy for the company. The dead hand proxy
put, however, will increase the cost of the corporate raider’s acquisition.
Specifically, this is because when he or she changes the board of directors
through a proxy contest, the dead hand put forces the company to repay all
of its debt. If the acquirer cannot change the board of directors by means of
a proxy contest, without placing this financial burden on the company, that
acquirer likely will be deterred from acquiring the company in the first
place. Although the dead hand proxy put does not make a hostile takeover
impossible,344 in the event of a successful proxy challenge it will create
burdensome costs to the company.345
2. A Similar Deterrent Effect
Continuing to compare the dead hand poison pill and the dead hand
proxy put, both have the effect of deterring shareholders from bringing a
proxy contest.346 In Toll Bros., the Chancery Court expressed grave
skepticism toward dead hand poison pills.347 The court disapproved of the
negative effects the dead hand feature had on the stockholder franchise.348
In a takeover scenario, an acquirer often tenders an offer to buy the
outstanding shares of the target, while at the same time initiating a proxy
340. See supra Part II.D.1; see also Coffee Jr., supra note 102, at 1520.
341. See supra Part II.D.1.
342. BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 10.
343. See supra Part I.B.1. A poison put might be triggered by the sale of 51 percent of
the company. BERESKIN & BOWERS, supra note 88, at 1.
344. The dead hand proxy put does not completely ban hostile takeovers. Instead, it
allows the board of directors to change, but requires the company to pay back all of its debt.
See supra Part I.B.2. By contrast, the dead hand poison pill has a stronger force. See Coffee
Jr., supra note 102, at 1520. They put a complete ban on the board’s ability to redeem the
poison pill. See supra Part I.C.1; see also Coffee Jr., supra note 102, at 1520 (noting that
while poison puts are a takeover defense, they are less preventative than poison pills because
they will not stop a takeover in situations where the hostile bidder is willing to pay off the
debt).
345. See supra Part I.B.2.
346. See supra Part I.B.3, C.2.
347. See supra Part I.C.2.
348. See supra Part I.C.2.
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contest to nominate a slate of directors who will redeem the pill.349 Since
only continuing directors may redeem a rights plan that contains a dead
hand provision, electing a new slate of directors does not stop the poison
pill from being triggered.350 As a result, the new board is powerless to
redeem the pill, and stockholders are more likely to vote for the incumbent
board, which has the ability to prevent the disastrous financial effects of the
poison pill.
The dead hand proxy put has similar deterring effects and, thus, should
also be found invalid.351 In Healthways, the Chancery Court likened dead
hand proxy puts to dead hand poison pills, stating that, in both instances,
stockholders are deterred from bringing potential proxy contests.352 The
dead hand proxy put has the effect of disenfranchising stockholders by
depriving them of any practical choice to vote for anyone other than the
incumbent directors.353 Commentators argue that stockholders are not
disenfranchised because the new board simply can refinance the debt if the
proxy put is triggered or renegotiate with the bank to remove the proxy
put.354 Both of these alternatives, however, can prove costly and potentially
force the company to choose between refinancing the debt on unfavorable
terms and suffering a liquidity crisis.355 Thus, the Chancery Court in
Healthways correctly characterized the dead hand proxy put as creating a
“Sword of Damocles,” whereby shareholders are deterred from threatening
a proxy contest because of the dead hand provisions.356 The court should
not uphold a defense mechanism with such strong implications on the
stockholders ability to elect a new board.
3. A Similar Entrenchment Effect
Disenfranchising the stockholders has the effect of entrenching
management. While the dead hand poison pill arguably has a greater
entrenchment effect because it is adopted unilaterally by the board of
directors for the sole purpose of preventing a hostile takeover, the dead

349. See supra Parts I.C.3, II.C.1.
350. See supra Part I.C.2.
351. See supra Part II.D.1. In Amylin, the court suggested that provisions so strongly in
derogation of the stockholders’ rights could ultimately be unenforceable as a matter of public
policy. See San Antonio Fire & Police Pension Fund v. Amylin Pharms., Inc., 983 A.2d 304,
315 (Del. Ch. 2009); see also supra Part II.A.1.
352. See supra Part II.C.
353. See supra Part II.D.1.
354. See Reindel et al., supra note 132. These commentators further argue that the dead
hand feature of the poison pill has unknown, catastrophic implications, while the dead hand
proxy put has a finite amount of debt that the board can refinance. Id.
355. In another recent battle for board seats where a proxy put was present, triggering the
put would have required the company to repay $2.88 billion worth of notes. At that time, the
company only had $364 million in cash and cash equivalents. In the event the company was
forced to repay the $2.88 billion, it would not have had enough cash to do so. See UPDATE
2-Activist Investor Casablanca May Sue Miner Cliffs in Proxy Fight, REUTERS (May 29,
2014), http://www.reuters.com/article/cliffs-natural-investor-proxy-fighting-idUSL1N0OF18
G20140529 [https://perma.cc/6ZP8-V6MB].
356. Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 15, at 74.
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hand proxy put also has a similar entrenchment effect. The Delaware
Chancery Court has criticized the entrenchment effects of both the dead
hand poison pill and the dead hand proxy put.357 In the cases involving
dead hand proxy puts and dead hand poison pills, the consequences of
removing the incumbent board are so significant that the defense
mechanisms serve to entrench the existing board members at the expense of
the stockholder franchise.
In Sandridge, the Chancery Court explicitly stated that independent
directors should “police aspects of [proxy put] agreements . . . to ensure that
the company itself is not offering up these terms lightly precisely because
of their entrenching utility.”358 There, the court made clear that where there
is a proxy put present, an incumbent board must approve the new directors
and neutralize the proxy put unless there is a specific and substantial risk to
the corporation or its creditors.359 Because of the preclusive language in
dead hand proxy puts, the incumbent board does not even have the
opportunity to approve the new directors for purposes of neutralizing the
proxy put. Therefore, the entrenching effects of the dead hand proxy put
are even further reaching.
Moreover, the dead hand proxy put is correctly categorized as an
embedded defense masked as serving a legitimate purpose, when instead it
functions to entrench management.360 The legitimate purpose, in the case
of proxy puts, is arguably the protection of the creditors.361 While creditors
do have an interest in putting dead hand proxy puts in their credit
agreements to protect against the risk associated with a change in control,
creditors can achieve risk reduction without using mechanisms that both
eviscerate the stockholder franchise and entrench management.362
Creditors argue that proxy puts are needed protection against shareholder
activists because activists take control only to issue large dividends or issue
more debt to afford large share buybacks.363 Creditors, however, can
protect against activist actions in a less entrenching way. For instance, they
can include other covenants in their debt agreements, such as covenants that
specifically restrict the payment of excessive dividends, limit an increase in
the company’s outstanding debt, or prevent sale of the company’s assets

357. See supra Parts I.C.2, II.C.
358. Sandridge v. Kallick, 68 A.3d 242, 248 (Del. Ch. 2013).
359. Id. The court also explained that directors are under no obligation to place any
greater emphasis on the interest of noteholders in making their decision as to the proxy put.
360. See supra Part II.B.1.
361. Commentators argue that dead hand poison pills and dead hand proxy puts are
fundamentally different because dead hand proxy puts involve third party creditors, while
dead hand poison pills do not. See supra Part II.D.2; Coffee Jr., supra note 102, at 1528
(explaining that poison puts are distinguishable from poison pills because poison puts are
bilateral contracts and not unilateral actions of management).
362. In Healthways, the Delaware Chancery Court suggested that there were other ways
for creditors to get protection that do not involve entrenchment management or inhibiting
stockholders’ rights. See supra notes 283–85 and accompanying text.
363. See supra Part II.D.2.
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above a certain threshold.364 Thus, creditors can still protect themselves
from excessive dividends or reduced liquidity using covenants other than
dead hand proxy puts. Covenants addressing the specific actions taken by a
new board once an activist campaign is successful, as opposed to the
change in control itself, can provide adequate protection for creditors,
without entrenching management or limiting stockholders’ ability to bring a
proxy contest.
4. A Similar Limiting Effect on the Board of Directors’
Duties Under DGCL Section 141(a)
Not only do dead hand proxy puts have similar effects on shareholders
and management, but, like dead hand poison pills, they also prohibit the
board of directors from fulfilling its fiduciary duties in accordance with
DGCL section 141(a). In Quickturn, the Delaware Supreme Court used this
antidisablement principle to invalidate dead hand poison pills.365 When
considering that dead hand proxy puts have the same impact on a board in
that they prevent the directors from taking actions that are in the best
interest of the shareholders, the Delaware courts should outlaw dead hand
proxy puts.
Section 141(a) provides the board of directors with the authority to
manage the “business and affairs” of the corporation.366 The Delaware
court has upheld the corporate board’s statutory authority to manage the
corporation and has expressed its “concomitant fiduciary duty pursuant to
that statutory mandate.”367 As a result, any defense mechanism that
prevents the board from “exercise[ing] [its] own best judgment on matters
coming before the board” violates the duty owed to each director.368
In Quickturn, the Delaware Supreme Court ultimately concluded that the
no hand poison pills were invalid because they prevented the newly elected
board of directors from managing and directing the business and affairs of
the corporation.369 There, only continuing directors could redeem the
poison pill, and only the incumbent directors were considered continuing
directors for purposes of redeeming the poison pill.370 As a result, the
defense mechanism required the new board to breach its fiduciary duty any
time it was in the best interest of the company to have the board redeem the
pill.371 The court held that “no defensive measure can be sustained when it
represents a breach of the directors’ fiduciary duty.”372

364. They also can include ratings decline covenants as a means of protection, whereby
interest rates increase upon a decrease in a bond rating. See supra note 101 and
accompanying text.
365. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281, 1291 (Del. 1998).
366. See supra Part I.C.2; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2012).
367. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1291.
368. Id. at 1292.
369. See supra Part I.C.2.
370. Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1289.
371. See id. at 1292.
372. Id. at 1291–92.
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The Quickturn Court further emphasized that “[t]o the extent that a
contract, or a provision thereof, purports to require a board to act or not act
in such a fashion as to limit the exercise of fiduciary duties, it is invalid and
unenforceable.”373 Dead hand proxy puts are precisely such a contract.
They are provisions, embedded in contracts, that prohibit a board from
exercising its fiduciary duties. When a dissident slate of directors is elected
through a threatened or actual proxy contest, the incumbent board is
powerless to stop the dead hand proxy put, even if it is in the best interest of
the corporation.374
Commentators argue that the incumbent board can renegotiate the debt or
trigger the proxy put and then later refinance corporation’s debt.375
However, as discussed above, these costly alternatives will not always be in
the best interest of the company. Directors have the authority to exercise
their own judgment regarding the corporation’s business matters376 and thus
should not be prevented from approving new directors to the board if doing
so is in the corporation’s best interest. As a result, precluding their ability
to approve the new directors for purposes of neutralizing the dead hand
proxy put prevents them from fulfilling their fiduciary duties to the
corporation under section 141(a).
While commentators argue that the use of the dead hand feature is
necessary to make the proxy put effective,377 this argument lacks merit.
The Delaware Chancery Court has provided a fair standard for when a
board must approve directors for purposes of a proxy put without a dead
hand feature.378 Based on the Chancery Court’s rulings in Amylin and
Sandridge, a traditional proxy put, with no dead hand feature, will be
effective in preventing a change in control only when it is in the best
interest of the corporation and the creditors.379
Moreover, the court’s decision to review traditional proxy puts under
Unocal’s intermediate standard of review is appropriate given the defensive
nature of the proxy puts and the entrenching effects that they have on
management.380 The incumbent management, under this standard, does not
always have to approve the new directors, but must do so if failure to
approve them would constitute a breach of a fiduciary duty.381 In the event
that approving the new directors creates a substantial risk to the corporation

373. Id. at 1292 (citing Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,
51 (1994)).
374. See supra Part I.B.3. Approving the new slate of directors when there is a dead hand
proxy put in place is meaningless because the new directors will remain noncontinuing for
purposes of the proxy put.
375. See Reindel et al., supra note 132.
376. See Quickturn, 721 A.2d at 1292.
377. See supra Part I.C.2.
378. See supra Part II.A.3, B.3. The dead hand feature eliminates the need for this
standard because the incumbent board may never approve the new slate of directors.
379. See supra Part II.A.3, B.3.
380. See Kallick v. Sandridge, 68 A.32 242, 258 (Del. Ch. 2011).
381. Id. at 260; see supra Part II.B.3.
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or the creditors, the board of directors is not obliged to approve them.382
This provides an adequate remedy for the board without allowing it to use
the dead hand feature of the proxy put solely for entrenchment purposes.
Thus, allowing the use of traditional proxy puts, without the dead hand
feature, gives effect to change in control provisions, without violating
DGCL section 141.
CONCLUSION
With the rise in shareholder activism, dead hand proxy puts are playing a
more significant role in corporate debt agreements. Recent Delaware
litigation is indicative of the debate among shareholders, management, and
creditors as to provisions’ legality. The Delaware Chancery Court has
recognized the harmful nature and effect of dead hand proxy puts. The
Chancery Court should, however, go one step further and outlaw dead hand
proxy puts in Delaware. Ultimately, the Chancery Court should condemn
dead hand proxy puts as both overdeterring on shareholders and
overentrenching on management, while upholding traditional proxy puts as
valid under Delaware law.

382. See Kallick, 68 A.32 at 260; supra Part II.B.3 The board is, however, required to
substantiate a risk that goes beyond distaste for the new directors or wanting to keep their
own position.

